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Do citizens have any Fourth Amendment protection from sense-
enhancing surveillance technologies in public? This Article engages
a timely question as new surveillance technologies have redefined
expectations of privacy in public spaces. It proposes a new theory of
Fourth Amendment security based on the ancient theory of curtilage
protection for private property. Curtilage has long been understood
as a legal fiction that expands the protection of the home beyond the
formal structures of the house. Based on custom and law protecting
against both nosy neighbors and the government, curtilage was
defined by the actions the property owner took to signal a protected
space. In simple terms, by building a wall around one’s house, the
property owner marked out an area of private control. So, too, the
theory of personal curtilage turns on persons being able to control the
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protected areas of their lives in public by similarly signifying that an
area is meant to be secure from others.
This Article develops a theory of personal curtilage built on four
overlapping foundational principles. First, persons can build a
constitutionally protected space secure from governmental surveil-
lance in public. Second, to claim this space as secure from govern-
mental surveillance, the person must affirmatively mark that space
in some symbolic manner. Third, these spaces must be related to
areas of personal autonomy or intimate connection, be it personal,
familial, or associational. Fourth, these contested spaces—like
traditional curtilage—will be evaluated by objectively balancing
these factors to determine if a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred. Adapting the framework of traditional trespass, an
intrusion by sense-enhancing technologies into this protected
personal curtilage would be a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes. The Article concludes that the theory of personal curtilage
improves and clarifies the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and
offers a new framework for future cases. It also highlights the need
for a new vision of trespass to address omnipresent sense-enhancing
surveillance technologies.
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“The Fourth Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated....’ This inestimable
right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of
his secret affairs.” 1
INTRODUCTION
A neighborhood is targeted for enhanced police surveillance:
drones fly overhead,2 video cameras record each intersection,3
license plate readers scan each automobile,4 facial recognition
devices monitor particular buildings,5 and aural surveillance records
conversations on the street.6 If an individual enters that public
space, does the Fourth Amendment offer any protection from such
government surveillance? Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2012
decision in United States v. Jones,7 the answer would have been
“no,” the Fourth Amendment does not protect what one has
knowingly exposed to the public.8 After Jones, the answer is less
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
2. See Brian Bennett, Spy Drones Aiding Police, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, at A1; Lev
Grossman, Drone Home, TIME, Feb. 11, 2013, at 26; Jason Koebler, Police to Use Drones for
Spying on Citizens, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/
articles/2012/08/23/docs-law-enforcement-agencies-plan-to-use-domestic-drones-for-surveill
ance.
3. See David Gambacorta & Morgan Zalot, Surveillance Cameras Prove Helpful in Crime
Probes, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 1, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-02-01/news/3666189
5_1_surveillance-cameras-surveillance-network-high-crime-areas; Alexis Madrigal, DARPA’s
1.8 Gigapixel Drone Camera Could See You Waving at It from 15,000 Feet, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1,
2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/02/darpas-18-giga
pixel-drone-camera-could-see-you-waving-at-it-from-15-000-feet/272796/.
4. See John Phillips, Smile! Your Car’s on Cop Camera, CAR & DRIVER (Dec. 2011),
http://www.caranddriver.com/features/smile-your-cars-on-camera-we-ride-along-to-learn-
what-the-cops-know-about-you-feature.
5. See Douglas A. Fretty, Face-Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth
Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 430, 434-35 (2011) (“Police famously
scanned the crowds at the 2001 Tampa Bay Super Bowl with FRT, identifying nineteen
criminal suspects but making no arrests.”) (citations omitted).
6. See Mark Berman, Buses Have Eyes—and Sometimes Ears, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2012,
at B1; Wendy Ruderman, Is Our Little Talk Being Recorded? It’s Harder to Tell, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2013, at A17.
7. 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (finding no expectation of privacy in the operation of an automobile
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certain, as a majority of Justices appear to be troubled by the
aggregation of collected public information, even information
knowingly exposed to the public.9 
The question remains: does a space, constitutionally protected
from technologically enhanced surveillance, exist in public? And, if
so, how should it be defined consistent with the text, history, and
theory of the Fourth Amendment?10 This Article engages a timely
question as new surveillance technologies have redefined expecta-
tions of privacy in public spaces.11 It examines an open question as
the Supreme Court has been unable to agree on a framework for
protecting people in public.12
In response to these questions, this Article proposes a new
theory of Fourth Amendment security based on the ancient theory
of curtilage for private property.13 Curtilage has long been
understood as a legal fiction that expands the protection of the home
beyond the formal structures of the house.14 Curtilage recognizes a
buffer zone beyond the four walls of the home that deserves
protection even in areas observable to the public.15 Based on custom
and law protecting against both nosy neighbors and the
on a public highway or the movement of objects in the “open fields”).
9. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
313-14 (2012).
10. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy,
or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 322-23 (1998); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?
Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 119, 137 (2002); James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 322-23 (2002).
11. Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology,
Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 169 (2002) (“Privacy, when
defined as the boundary-maintenance necessary to individual and group definition,
recognizes—in a way that the Supreme Court and many commentators do not—that the
‘private’ can happen in ‘public.’ We do not shed all privacy expectations simply because we
walk on a public street, or enter a classroom, or attend a ball game.”) (citation omitted).
12. See infra Part I.B. It is also a well-considered problem, as many Fourth Amendment
scholars have offered thoughtful analyses of this doctrinally difficult problem.
13. See infra Part II.
14. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
182 n.12 (1984). See generally Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of
the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 298-
303 (2005) (providing a history of the curtilage doctrine).
15. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (defining curtilage as “the land immediately surrounding
and associated with the home” (citation omitted)); United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109,
1112 (7th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (defining curtilage as “an imaginary boundary line between
privacy and accessibility to the public”).
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government, courts defined curtilage by the actions the property
owner took to signal a protected space.16 In simple terms, by
building a wall around one’s house, the property owner marked out
an area of private control.17 Similarly, the theory of personal
curtilage turns on persons being able to control the constitutionally
protected areas of their lives in public by signifying that they intend
for an area to be secure from physical and sense-enhancing
invasion. 
Why focus on curtilage? First, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in Jones gave new life to the idea that trespass is still an influential
Fourth Amendment theory.18 The majority held that if police
trespass on personal property—an “effect” within the framework of
the Fourth Amendment—a search occurs.19 This is so even if third
parties can observe the “effect”—the car—in public and even if it
produces only public information.20 Second, Justice Scalia reiterated
the centrality of curtilage in Florida v. Jardines, holding that a dog
sniff on the curtilage of a home was a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.21 As curtilage has always been a doctrine tied to trespass-
based property theories, studying it in light of new technologies
provides new insights.22 At the same time, the concurring Justices
16. Amelia L. Diedrich, Note, Secure in Their Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the
Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297,
300 (2011) (“As a means of defense in England’s ‘early times,’ it was customary for home
owners to surround their home and related buildings with a ‘substantial wall.’ The resulting
area inside the wall and outside the home was known as the curtilage.”). 
17. Blackstone explained: “And if the barn, stable or warehouse be parcel of the mansion-
house, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein;
for the capital house protects and privileges all it’s [sic] branches and appurtenants, if within
the curtilage or homestall.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220, *225.
18. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“Consistent with this under-
standing, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least
until the latter half of the 20th century.” (citations omitted)). But see Orin S. Kerr, The
Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 1 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 67-69 (2012) (arguing
that trespass did not control early Fourth Amendment cases).
19. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
20. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
3 & n.12 (2012).
21. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013) (“The officers were gathering
information in an area belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house-in the
curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”).
22. See infra Part III. Trespass, as will be developed, can result when sense-enhancing
surveillance devices are utilized to obtain information that would not ordinarily be obtainable
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in Jones expressed dissatisfaction with a limited property-based
conception of trespass, seeking to expand Fourth Amendment
protections to people in public.23 Although not agreeing on a
framework, at least five Justices in Jones acknowledged that new
surveillance technologies required new Fourth Amendment thinking
to address privacy concerns in public.24 
As this Article will develop, curtilage provides a definitional tool
rooted in the common law, and yet adaptable to the surveillance
age. First, the creation of spaces of curtilage recognized that
profoundly private events occurred in public.25 Much of the deep
respect for this space involved its ties to intimate associations of
family, friends, private worship, and personal habits even in
observable areas.26 Second, curtilage focused as much on security as
privacy, marking out a defensive space against government
invasion.27 Third, curtilage was a doctrine rooted in custom and
law.28 Although one could sue for trespass in courts, the harm was
a violation not only of the rules of property, but also the rules of
social custom.29 The metaphorical wall did not merely keep out
prying eyes, but symbolically informed those eyes of when and
through human senses.
23. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 957-58 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
24. Id. at 947.
25. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (defining curtilage as “the area
to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home’ ” (citation
omitted)).
26. See Catherine Hancock, Justice Powell’s Garden: The Ciraolo Dissent and Fourth
Amendment Protection for Curtilage-Home Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 551, 557 (2007).
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. Wellford v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 235, 238 (Va. 1984) (“In England the curtilage
seems to have included only the buildings within the inner fence or yard, because there, in
early times, for defense, the custom was to enclose such place with a substantial wall.... In
this country, however, such walls or fences, in many cases, do not exist, so that with us the
curtilage includes the cluster of buildings constituting the habitation or dwelling place,
whether enclosed with an inner fence or not.” (citations omitted) (quoting Bare v.
Commonwealth, 94 S.E. 168, 172 (Va. 1917))).
29. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 195-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Private land marked in a
fashion sufficient to render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the State in
which the land lies [should be] protected by the Fourth Amendment. [This rule] draws upon
a doctrine already familiar to both citizens and government officials.”); Jim Harper, Reforming
Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381, 1387 (2008) (“Our world is built
for ornate combinations of privacy and disclosure that are almost always customary, habitual,
or subconscious.”); see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 312 n.3 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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where they needed to stop looking.30 Fourth, curtilage shifted the
burden of creating protected spaces to the individual, and not the
government. It was the individual who would build the wall or fence
around the property.31 Finally, it was a limited space of protection.
Curtilage expanded the scope of personal security, but only slightly,
thus carving out some protected space in public, but not so much as
to upset the balance of existing law.32
This Article applies the theory of Fourth Amendment curtilage
to persons acting in public.33 It is necessarily an inexact application,
but a theory that offers several insights about the modern Fourth
Amendment doctrine. First, an analysis of Fourth Amendment
curtilage recognizes that the prevailing binary analysis of a greater
protection in the home and a lesser protection outside of the home
rests on an outdated foundation.34 New technologies can see, hear,
sense, and invade the home and public space with equal ease.
Traditional public/private boundaries no longer guarantee privacy
protection. Curtilage thus exists as a gray area offering a middle
range of privacy. Second, in emphasizing security—“[t]he right ... to
be secure”35—as the operative language in the Fourth Amendment,
a curtilage-based theory offers a better frame of analysis than an
“expectation of privacy.”36 As other scholars have noted, the Fourth
Amendment by its plain language protects the right to be “secure,”
not the right to privacy.37 As new technologies make old expecta-
tions of privacy obsolete, a new focus is needed. Finally, this theory
shifts the power of who gets to define the protected space.38 Instead
of a court divining what society considers an objectively “reasonable”
expectation of privacy,39 based on little more than the court’s own
30. Again, a wall did not make it physically impossible to spy on a house, just socially and
legally wrong to cross the threshold to invade private activities. 
31. See infra notes 277-281 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part II.D.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 906-08 (2010).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. E.g., Clancy, supra note 10, at 308.
38. Again, as this Article will discuss, the shift gives the individual seeking security more
power to define areas secure against government surveillance.
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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vision of such an expectation, now courts might look to steps the
individual took to establish the protected space. 
To be clear, the concept of “personal curtilage” is as much a legal
fiction40 as traditional property-based curtilage, but as this Article
will develop, both are necessary fictions that allow a balance
between personal and societal security. In a new technological age
of aggressive surveillance, personal curtilage carves out a defensible
space of protection. It is a space controlled by the individual and
dependent on the individual’s own affirmative action for protection.
It is a limited space that may not cover everything exposed to the
public, but may also be more protective than the current doctrine.
Finally, it requires a new understanding of Fourth Amendment
trespass that maps sense-enhancing technological invasions as
equivalent to physical invasions in an earlier era.
Part I of this Article sets out the current doctrinal uncertainty
in the Fourth Amendment. Although much insightful scholarship
exists on the subject, Fourth Amendment protections in public
remain unclear.41 The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into the
subject in United States v. Jones has only added to the uncertainty.42
Part I argues that a new framework is necessary to address the
unanswered questions of where and how a constitutionally protected
space can exist in public.
Part II looks at the concept of Fourth Amendment curtilage as
a definitional frame to create a parallel space in public. In part, the
attraction of using curtilage as a model is that it exists as an
acknowledged legal fiction created precisely because traditional
concepts of property were too restrictive.43 It argues that certain
40. Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 759 n.36 (2002) (describing
curtilage as a legal fiction).
41. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous
Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1, 70-71 (2005); Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS Surveillance:
Search and Seizure-Using the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of GPS
Tracking Systems Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 303, 311 (2011); Lewis
R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 554-
55 (1990); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
505-07 (2007); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J.
1309, 1334-36 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amend-
ment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1393, 1396-97 (2002). 
42. 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012); see also Slobogin, supra note 20, at 1-4.
43. Constitutional curtilage was created to expand the space of the house in the
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actions in public view are still private, or at least should be secure
from physical or sense-enhancing invasions. It also recognizes that
persons have the power to shape law and custom about how to
define the boundaries of that protection. The Supreme Court’s
discussion of curtilage specifically includes an analysis of the uses
to which the property was put and the steps taken to preserve the
area as private.44
Part III defines the theory of personal curtilage. Building off the
argument that security and not privacy is the better foundation to
structure Fourth Amendment protections, it focuses on individual
actions that mark out areas of protected space to further the
autonomy interests of individuals. The theory of personal curtilage
rests on four overlapping foundational principles. First, persons in
public should be able to carve out constitutionally protected areas
secure from government surveillance.45 This constitutionally
protected area may be limited, but it exists.46 Second, in order to
claim that security, persons must affirmatively act to mark out the
area of security.47 This marker involves both a claim against the
government and other individuals similarly situated.48 Third, these
areas of Fourth Amendment security must be related to areas of
personal activity similar to the focus on intimate detail around the
home.49 Finally, personal curtilage works within the existing Fourth
Amendment framework for many situations in public. The reason
individuals can be secure in what they carry in closed containers, or
under their clothing, is that law and custom respect a zone of
recognition that certain areas still deserved protection even outside the four walls of the
house. See supra note 25.
44. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1987).
45. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1964
(2013).
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). For example, a person in public may
be able to secure what he says to another person, but not the identity of whom they are
speaking with. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding no expectation of
privacy in phone numbers dialed). Like Katz, an individual in a public phone booth could
claim an expectation of security in the conversation, even if one could plainly see him in
public. 389 U.S. at 352.
47. See infra Part III.B.
48. Like building a wall or, as in Katz, shutting the phone booth door, these symbolic
markers help define the area of security.
49. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 (“[C]urtilage is so intimately tied to the home itself that it
should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
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security from surveillance in what we choose to conceal on our
persons, even in public.50 This Part argues first that a zone of
security should exist in public for individuals, and then offers an
analytical framework to define that zone.51 
Part IV applies the theory of personal curtilage to the hypotheti-
cal surveillance state set out at the beginning of the Article. It
concludes that the development of personal curtilage improves and
clarifies the existing Fourth Amendment uncertainty and offers a
framework for future cases. It also addresses the need for a new
vision of trespass to address the potential of non-physically invasive
technological surveillance. 
Part V addresses a few concerns with the proposal. As with any
new theory, questions in application and tensions with existing law
arise. As this Article will develop, however, these tensions are
revealing of the strength of the personal curtilage approach and will
serve to highlight concerns for courts attempting to address the
issue of technological surveillance in public.
I. A DOCTRINAL MUDDLE: FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS IN
PUBLIC
The puzzle of the Fourth Amendment is that courts and scholars
keep trying to make the legal pieces fit without any agreed vision of
its history or purpose.52 Of course, historical understandings inform
50. Harper, supra note 29, at 1387, 1398-99 (“But when a person walking on the street
carries an aspirin tablet in a coat pocket, that fact is not available to anyone. The physical
barrier of the fabric prevents others from gaining access to that information.”). Although the
term “personal curtilage” has not been used, society has accepted that a person’s action of
concealing a private item in a briefcase or in a pocket is deserving of Fourth Amendment
respect, even if it were technologically possible to x-ray the person or otherwise discover what
he was carrying. 
51. It should be noted that the two steps are separate, and one could well agree that a
zone of security exists without necessarily accepting the definitional framework proposed.
52. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 10, at 308-09; Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 801, 809 (2004); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting
the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1229-30 (1983); Jack Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s
House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere
Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1030-31 (2012); Daniel
J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial
Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 751 (2005).
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general principles, but present realities of a professional police
force53 and physics-defying technologies54 make reliance on any
original meaning a guessing game. Textual ambiguities, such as
“probable cause” or “unreasonable,”55 only increase the uncertainty,
as judges can reframe or reconstitute the terms of art to match a
prevailing judicial philosophy.56 And the longstanding judicial
tensions between the criminal procedure theories of the Warren
Court, and the Rehnquist and now the Roberts Courts, have
resulted in an inconsistent, unanchored patchwork of cases filled
with doctrinal gaps and without any coherent theory.
Perhaps the only area of agreement among courts and scholars
is that the current Fourth Amendment is a muddle of a doctrine.57
Attacked as “subjective and unpredictable,”58 “riddled with inconsis-
tency and incoherence,”59 and analytically devoid of an overarching
structure,60 one commentator has described the current doctrine as
53. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 989-90 (2011); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 620-22 (1999).
54. Fretty, supra note 5, at 434-35.
55. “How do we know what society is prepared to accept as reasonable? Because there is
no straightforward answer to this question, ‘reasonable’ has largely come to mean what a
majority of the Supreme Court Justices says is reasonable.” ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES,
SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 (2003).
56. Justice Scalia has complained that the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test
essentially boils down to “those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.”
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. E.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 555 (1996) (“Fourth
Amendment theory is in tatters at the end of the twentieth century. The disarray in the
Supreme Court’s recent case law has been explored in numerous scholarly articles and judicial
dissents.”) (citations omitted); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997); Kerr, supra note 52, at 479 (“Scholars complain that
the law is ‘a mess,’ ‘an embarrassment,’ and ‘a mass of contradictions.’ ”) (quoting, Ronald J.
Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus
General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998)); Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985).
58. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test—whether the individual
has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often
been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”).
59. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010)
(“The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious jurisprudence that is
riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.”).
60. Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 347 (“The development of the reasonable expectation of
privacy threshold doctrine has occurred in a piecemeal, ad hoc fashion. No overarching
scheme or analytical framework is evident in the Court’s threshold decisions.”).
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a Rube Goldberg contraption61—unnecessarily complex, odd, and yet
fascinating to study and observe. As this Article proposes a new
piece of the puzzle for protections of people in public, one must
review the general themes of Fourth Amendment theory. These
themes of constitutionally protected areas, trespass theory, and the
reasonable expectation of privacy all inform—and are incorporated
into—the theory of personal curtilage. This Part will briefly
summarize each theme in turn, with a specific focus on how the
Fourth Amendment protects persons in public.62 
A. Past Tensions: The Fourth Amendment in Flux
The early history of the Fourth Amendment offers few clues
about the scope of its protection.63 Plainly at the time of the
Founding, invasive surveillance technology did not exist.64 More
generally, of course, it is well settled that the Framers greatly
valued intellectual freedom, physical liberty, and personal property.
It is equally certain that a fear of arbitrary overreaching govern-
ment action motivated the passage of the Fourth Amendment.65 But,
61. Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Technology
and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 5-7 (2002).
62. It is this protection in public that raises difficult questions for the Fourth Amendment.
As Anthony G. Amsterdam wrote years ago:
[S]o far as I am presently advised of the state of the mechanical arts—anyone
can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the
windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely
quiet. This much withdrawal is not required in order to claim the benefit of the
amendment because, if it were, the amendment’s benefit would be too stingy to
preserve the kind of open society to which we are committed and in which the
amendment is supposed to function.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 402
(1974).
63. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (extending Fourth Amendment
protection to letters and sealed packages partly based on a First Amendment theory). 
64. See Clancy, supra note 53, at 989-90.
65. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“The Fourth Amendment protects private citizens from arbitrary surveillance by their
Government.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (“The practice had obtained
in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering them, in their
discretion, to search suspected places for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced ‘the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the
fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;’ since they placed
‘the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.’ ” (citations omitted)).
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as there were almost no Fourth Amendment opinions during the
first century of the United States, we are left with broad themes,
but few particulars on which to base a theory.
In 1886, the Supreme Court decided its first significant Fourth
Amendment case in Boyd v. United States, a broadly sweeping
opinion that linked personal security, property, and the forced
compulsion of documents into a newly protective view of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.66 Boyd addressed a court order that
required the production of incriminating documents involving the
commercial sale of plate glass.67 Invoking the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,68 the Court held that a court order compelling a
commercial business to produce documents of a transactional
nature, even without any physical or actual search or seizure, would
violate the Fourth Amendment.69 The Court’s language went beyond
property or papers, reaching personal security and liberty:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence
of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than
the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of
some public offence.70
66. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
67. Id. at 618.
68. Id. at 633 (“We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amend-
ments. They throw great light on each other. For the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’
condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling
a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment; and compelling a man ‘in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ which
is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an
‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
69. Id. at 622 (“It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man’s
private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and
seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose
of search and seizure.”).
70. Id. at 630.
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The Court’s decision was also notable for a few other reasons
relevant to this Article. First, the Court did not require a physically
invasive search to trigger the Fourth Amendment.71 Rather, the
Court expressed concern about any law enforcement technique that
forced individuals to reveal personal information.72 Second, the
Fourth Amendment covered information that made little objective
claim to personal privacy. At issue were records of business
transactions that had little personal value. Third, the protections
went beyond private papers or effects to a broader vision of
“personal security.”73 
The evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine, thus, began with
a nonphysical search of not really private information, based on
privileging the idea of personal security.74 As we will see, this broad
vision of the Fourth Amendment resonates when thinking about its
application in a technologically invasive world. 
71. The search was the result of the equivalent of a court order. Id. at 621-22.
72. In this way, many view Boyd more as a Fifth Amendment case rather than a Fourth
Amendment case. See, e.g., Suzanne Rosenthal Brackley, Now It’s Personal: Withdrawing the
Fifth Amendment’s Content-Based Protection for All Private Papers in United States v. Dow,
60 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 556-57 (1994); Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Production of Personal Documents after United States v. Hubbell—New Protection for Private
Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 131 (2002); Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a
Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (1999). Boyd also had a
limited Fourth Amendment life in practice, although commentators still cite it with some
regularity. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805,
814 (2005) (“[W]ithin twenty years the Court had reversed itself. In the 1906 case of Hale v.
Henkel, the defendant corporation, suspected of antitrust violations, relied on Boyd in arguing
that a grand jury subpoena for its documents violated both the Fifth and Fourth
Amendments. In finding for the government, the Court rejected the interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment that it had adopted in Boyd, and limited the Fourth Amendment’s relevance in
subpoena cases to a prohibition of overbroad requests.” (citations omitted)).
73. See infra Part III.
74. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635 (“Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of
the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their
substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the
obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations
from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed.”).
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1. Protected Interests/Trespass Theory
The Court soon abandoned Boyd’s expansive reach with more
limited interpretations of the Fourth Amendment.75 In what is
understood as the first era of modern Fourth Amendment thinking,
the Supreme Court adopted a property-based approach that looked
at physical invasions of constitutionally protected interests.76 These
interests included the textually mentioned “persons,” “houses,”
“papers,” and “effects”77 with a heavy emphasis on the heightened
protection of what Boyd termed the “sacred and incommunicable”
right of property.78
This property-focused understanding and its limitations are best
illustrated in the debate between Chief Justice Taft and Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.79 As a matter of doctrine,
Olmstead determined that for there to be a search, the government
must interfere with a person, home, paper, or effect in a trespassory
manner.80 At issue in Olmstead was an electronic wiretap that
recorded conversations of a conspiracy to import alcohol against
existing prohibition laws.81 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the
majority, reasoned that electronic eavesdropping did not trespass on
75. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407-08 (1976) (“Several of Boyd’s express or
implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-76
(1906) (limiting Boyd), overruled on other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New
York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
76. Gatewood, supra note 41, at 334 (“The Supreme Court continued to use the ‘trespass
doctrine’ as the main force behind Fourth Amendment protection until 1960, when the Court
began to slowly move away from basing its decisions on whether or not there had been a
physical trespass and instead suggesting that privacy was the real issue.” (citations omitted)).
77. Nowlin, supra note 52, at 1031-32 (“[T]he traditional [protected interest] approach
emphasized the interests specifically enumerated as protected in the text of the Fourth
Amendment, ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ and the common-law principles rooted in
property law that formed the important broader legal context of the text.” (citations omitted)).
78. Boyd, 116 U.S. 627 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029
(1765)); see also Clancy, supra note 10, at 309-27 (tracing the rise and demise of the property-
based, constitutionally protected area theory of the Fourth Amendment).
79. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
80. See id. at 465 (“The language of the Amendment can not be extended and expanded
to include telephone wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office.
The intervening wires are not part of his house or office.”). As this Article will discuss infra,
scholars such as Orin Kerr have argued that Olmstead was not, in fact, based on a trespass
theory. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 68.
81. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
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any property right and did not impact a person, home, paper, or
effect, and thus was not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.82
Under Olmstead, a court had to determine merely if the area fell
within the “protected interests” of the Constitution and whether
there had been a physical invasion of that interest.83 If not, the
Fourth Amendment provided no shelter.84 This holding, which
lasted for forty years until Katz v. United States replaced it,85
provided no defense to nontrespassory actions.86
Although Olmstead has been relegated to Fourth Amendment
history,87 the debate between Taft and Brandeis is strikingly rel-
evant to the issues of Fourth Amendment security in public today.
The choice of analytical frames remains contested: between a
narrow, constitutionally protected interests-oriented approach and
a more expansive, Boyd-influenced vision.88 
In Olmstead, Taft based his analysis on the limiting words of
the document: “The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be
of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his
effects.”89 In application, conversations overheard or items seen
cannot be protected under the Fourth Amendment because they are
not material things falling under the textual language.90 Then,
perfectly teeing up the issue of curtilage and surveillance, Taft
relied on Hester v. United States,91 a curtilage case, and United
82. Id. at 466.
83. See id.
84. See id. 
85. See infra Part I.A.2.
86. This statement is perhaps overbroad as the Supreme Court did apply the Fourth
Amendment to subpoenas even though they did not involve a trespass. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
87. Clancy, supra note 10, at 309-327.
88. The most recent example being the contrasting opinions in United States v. Jones. See
Part I.B.
89. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
90. See Slobogin, supra note 41, at 1397-98 (“Until the 1960s, the Fourth Amendment
protected against government trespass in any of the four areas named in the Fourth
Amendment—houses, persons, papers, and effects. Under that approach, the prevalence of
technology the police used was irrelevant. The sole inquiry was whether operation of the
technology required intrusion into a protected area. If so, a search occurred; if not, then the
Fourth Amendment was not implicated.”) (citations omitted).
91. 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924) (“It is obvious that even if there had been a trespass, the above
testimony was not obtained by an illegal search or seizure. The defendant’s own acts, and
those of his associates, disclosed the jug, the jar and the bottle—and there was no seizure in
the sense of the law when the officers examined the contents of each after it had been
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States v. Lee,92 a case involving a nighttime plain view search with
a spotlight, to hold that if officers observe an illegality, even if by
means of a trespass or the use of heightened technology, it is not a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as it does not
impact a constitutionally protected interest.93
Justice Brandeis, in contrast, began his dissent with the idea
that the Fourth Amendment must evolve from the language of the
text:
Protection against such invasion of “the sanctities of a man’s
home and the privacies of life” was provided in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments by specific language. But “time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government.94
Then, in what must be understood as one of the most prescient
dissents in constitutional history, he wrote:
Moreover, “in the application of a constitution, our contempla-
tion cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.” The
progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may
someday be developed by which the Government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home.95
To combat these new invasions, Brandeis envisioned a Fourth
Amendment that protected a wider category of interests, not limited
to homes, papers, or effects in homes. As he stated:
abandoned.”).
92. 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (“The testimony of the boatswain shows that he used a
searchlight.... Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field
glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution.”).
93. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 448-49, 465.
94. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see also id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Clauses guaranteeing
to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of
adaptation to a changing world.”).
95. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.... They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.96
This vision of the Fourth Amendment acknowledged the right to
be left alone. It articulated a space of privacy free from government
surveillance. It was based in part on Brandeis’s famous work on the
civil custom of privacy.97 It was also based on an idea of personal
autonomy unconfined to life at home, or hidden from view.98 The
Court eventually adopted a version of this idea in Katz, the subject
of the next Section.99
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Theory
The modern Fourth Amendment doctrine begins with Katz v.
United States.100 Much has been written about Katz, dissecting its
meaning and critiquing and reframing its emphasis.101 Like
Olmstead, Katz involved a wiretap of a suspected criminal, this time
involved in illegal gambling from a public payphone.102 As argued to
the Supreme Court, Katz presented the question of whether the
96. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
97. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205 (1891).
98. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1775 (1994).
99. Id. at 1756 (“Justice Brandeis’s view of the Fourth Amendment became accepted by
the Court in a later eavesdropping case, Katz v. United States.”).
100. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
101. See, e.g., Christian M. Halliburton, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: Cognitive Freedom
and Fourth Amendment Fidelity, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 311-13 (2007); Kerr, supra note 41,
at 504-07; David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS.
L.J. 143, 149-60 (2002); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead: Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904,
905 (2004).
102. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
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payphone constituted a “constitutionally protected area”103 and
whether “physical penetration of [the] constitutionally protected
area”104 was required for the Fourth Amendment to be violated. 
Justice Stewart, however, writing for the majority, rejected the
questions presented.105 Stewart argued that there was no general
right to privacy, as envisioned by the followers of Brandeis, and
further that the definitional battles over what was a constitutionally
protected area disserved the value of the Fourth Amendment.106
Stewart countered with the idea that: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.107
Thus, Katz’s actions of entering a public telephone booth, closing
the door, and paying the money to use the services of the phone
company entitled him to preserve his conversations as private.108
This was so even though the conversation was held in a publicly
observable space and concerned illegal activities. Stewart then
formally rejected the narrow trespass theory derived from
Olmstead.109
103. Id. at 349 (“Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so
that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such
a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.”).
104. Id. at 350 (“Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.”).
105. Id.; see Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 977, 996 (2008) (“Katz signified a shift away from the property-trespass theory
of Fourth Amendment analysis by finding a constitutionally protected interest separate from
any place and distinct from tangible property.”).
106. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
107. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 352 (“But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the
intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he
made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business
office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon
the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
109. Id. at 353 (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been
so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling. The Government’s activities in electronically listening to
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Although Stewart wrote the majority decision, Justice Harlan
wrote the concurring opinion that has served as the test for Fourth
Amendment searches post-Katz.110 Harlan wrote:
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” The
question, however, is what protection it affords to those people.
Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires
reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold require-
ment, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”111
Harlan applied this two-prong test, with subjective and objective
components, to find that the phone booth was a “temporarily private
place whose momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from
intrusion are recognized as reasonable.”112 Explaining the contours
of the protection, Harlan opined: “Thus a man’s home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities,
or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not
‘protected,’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited.”113 As is well understood, this expectation of privacy test
remains the dominant working theory of Fourth Amendment
protection.
3. Post-Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Doctrinal Gaps
Although the conflicting pieces of Fourth Amendment doctrine
are not clear, they are revealing. Certain principles reappear—a
concern about arbitrary government action,114 a reverence for
and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve
that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional
significance.”); Slobogin, supra note 41, at 1397-98.
110. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (recognizing that Justice Harlan’s
concurrence is the controlling analysis).
111. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[In the
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intimacy and autonomy,115 a primacy of certain traditional spaces,116
an acknowledgment of technological invasiveness,117 an emphasis on
constitutional text,118 and an evolving consideration of a sense of
private space—that reflect legal, social, and customary limits.119 Yet,
although these pieces exist together, the puzzle for the whole
remains.
Perhaps it is not surprising that, with such a fragmented
history, the Fourth Amendment has been the source of significant
academic commentary. Scholars have debated the textual meaning
of its clauses120 as well as the core purpose of the Amendment.121
The doctrinal gaps have been exposed, especially in a post-reason-
able expectation of privacy world.
GPS monitoring context, I question] the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the
absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially
in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and
prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’ ” (citation omitted)); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (explaining that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect against “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the
privacy and personal security of individuals” (citations omitted)); Camara v. Mun. Court of
S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment—is basic to a free society.”), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
115. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s
protections of the intimate details of the home); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) (“A
view of the world that recognizes the essential interconnectedness of people and the
importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign to the atomistic social theory underlying the
Court’s present doctrine.”); see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249, 1277 (2012) (“The history of the Fourth Amendment amply
supports the notion that it protects against the humiliation and loss of dignity wrought by
unreasonable government searches and seizures.”).
116. See notes infra 201-04 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (1967).
117. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (2012);
Slobogin, supra note 41, at 1397-98; Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 348.
118. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
119. See infra Part II.
120. Compare TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969),
with NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1970). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758-61 (1994); Davies, supra note 53, at 550-52. 
121. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964) (arguing that privacy protects human dignity and
autonomy).
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The general “theory of Fourth Amendment theory”122 is that
something is missing in the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test. Scholars have examined the types of interests protected to
determine the threshold question of when a government action
becomes a search. Does it matter the type of information being
observed?123 Do we judge it from an empirical framework of
reasonable expectations?124 Should there be a sliding scale?125 Does
the type of surveillance matter?126 Or the type of technology?127 Or,
is it the exploitation of the technology that makes it a search?128
Other scholars have looked at the unaddressed values underlying
the Fourth Amendment. Is the right to anonymity undervalued?129
122. The theory of Fourth Amendment theory might make an excellent law review topic,
as there exist hundreds of scholarly attempts to rework the doctrine. 
123. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo, A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1321-22 (2002)
(“[T]he method of surveillance should be irrelevant, and the results of the surveillance are all
that should matter in determining whether an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
has been infringed. Thus, in applying the Katz test, courts should look only to the
characteristics of the item or information being observed—its location, its nature, and/or the
actions taken by the defendant to conceal it.”).
124. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053 (1998); Christopher Slobogin, The World
Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991).
126. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 59, at 1514 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should provide
protection whenever a problem of reasonable significance can be identified with a particular
form of government information gathering.”).
127. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 52, at 480 (defining the equilibrium-adjustment theory of
the Fourth Amendment: “When changing technology or social practice makes evidence
substantially harder for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court generally adopts lower
Fourth Amendment protections for these new circumstances to help restore the status quo
ante level of government power. On the other hand, when changing technology or social
practice makes evidence substantially easier for the government to obtain, the Supreme Court
often embraces higher protections to help restore the prior level of privacy protection”).
128. See, e.g., Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 438 (“Official exploitation of a scientific or
technological device should be considered a Fourth Amendment search at least when the
effect is to enhance, augment or supplement human sensory abilities or other capacities in
ways that have made it possible for the authorities to gain access to any information that
otherwise would have been, or is highly likely to have been, imperceptible or inaccessible or
would only have been, or is highly likely only to have been, perceived or acquired by means
that are governed by the Fourth Amendment.”).
129. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002) (“Continuous, repeated or recorded
government surveillance of our innocent public activities that are not meant for public
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Or is the real issue one of power,130 dignity,131 autonomy,132 a lack of
respect,133 trust,134 or personal identity?135
This snapshot of Fourth Amendment academic commentary
reveals a common insight about the current doctrine: it is lacking a
core organizing principle that incorporates protections of property,
privacy, and security.136 This confusion is only exacerbated by the
fractured analysis of the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones.
As this Article will discuss in the next section, Jones significantly
increases the uncertainty about how to analyze surveillance in
public.
consumption is neither expected nor to be condoned, for it ignores the fundamental fact that
we express private thoughts through conduct as well as through words. The Fourth
Amendment should be construed to recognize the right to public anonymity as a part of the
privacy expectations that, to use the Supreme Court’s well-known phrase, ‘society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.’ ”).
130. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002) (“The Fourth
Amendment protects power not privacy.”).
131. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Miller, Dignity as a New Framework, Replacing the Right to
Privacy, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (proposing that dignity replace privacy as the
core Fourth Amendment point of analysis); id. at 20 (“For example, were ‘search’ defined as
a violation of intrinsic human dignity, it is likely the Court would recognize aerial surveillance
into one’s backyard, without warrant, as a violation of the home dweller’s dignity. Stop and
frisk, based on less than probable cause, would similarly violate reasonable standards of
dignity. And, for the motorist, whose car might in fact be his or her most cherished place,
arbitrary police intrusion might preclude much that happens today, since under present law,
if one steps into his or her car, he or she surrenders the ‘right to be let alone.’ ”).
132. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 11, at 152 (“Privacy is, however, more a matter of affect
than cognition. Privacy is a set of metaphorical boundaries that enables each of us to
safeguard a sense of self. Privacy enables us to decide which aspects of ourselves to reveal and
to whom. That control matters deeply, because overly selective exposure of ourselves to others
will lead to their misjudging our nature.”).
133. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 98 (2003) (“The Fourth Amendment protects core interests essential to
human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of movement.”).
134. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 98, at 1777.
135. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 11, at 131 (“Privacy in the information age is best
conceived as the maintenance of metaphorical boundaries that define the contours of personal
identity. Identity is complex; different circumstances reveal different aspects of our nature.
Each of us wears many masks wherein each mask reflects a different aspect of who we really
are. We do not want our entire natures to be judged by any one mask, nor do we want partial
revelations of our activities to define us in a particular situation as other than who we want
to be. In short, we want to choose the masks that we show to others; any such loss of choice
is painful, amounting almost to a physical violation of the self.”) (citations omitted).
136. As this Article will discuss in Part III, the theory of personal curtilage adds to these
other well-considered visions of the Fourth Amendment.
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B. Present Tensions: The Fourth Amendment After United States 
v. Jones
United States v. Jones perfectly encapsulates the confusion of
how surveillance technology has upended the Fourth Amendment
doctrine.137 In a case about wireless GPS monitoring—a technology
so precise that it reported Antoine Jones’s movements twenty-four
hours a day for twenty-eight days138—the Supreme Court majority
relied on an analogy to horse and buggies from the common law
era.139 Worse, the Court resolved the issue on the narrowest of
grounds, leading the concurring Justices to speculate on the impact
of Fourth Amendment technology in a way that has led some
scholars to question if the Justices understood what they were
saying.140
Much has already been written about Jones.141 It presented a
relatively straightforward question: Is the warrantless GPS
tracking of a suspect in public a search or seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes?142 The majority held that if a physical
trespass occurs there is a Fourth Amendment “search.” This is so
even if third parties can observe “the effect”—the car—in public.143
The majority further held that a government action can still be a
search, even if it produces only public information.144 
137. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 9, at 343-44 (critiquing the concurring Justices’ support for
what the author terms the “mosaic theory”).
138. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
139. Id. at 950 n.5 (“Justice Alito’s concurrence doubts the wisdom of our approach because
‘it is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what
took place in this case.’ But in fact it posits a situation that is not far afield—a constable’s
concealing himself in the target’s coach in order to track its movements. There is no doubt
that the information gained by that trespassory activity would be the product of an unlawful
search—whether that information consisted of the conversations occurring in the coach, or
of the destinations to which the coach traveled.” (citations omitted)).
140. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 9, at 313-14.
141. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability
in the 21st Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303 (2012); Kerr, supra note 9, at 313-14; Caren
Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, The Narc, and the Very Tiny Constable: Reflections on
United States v. Jones, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113 (2012); Erin Murphy, Back to the Future:
The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325 (2012).
142. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
143. See id. at 953 n.8 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches only
with regard to those items (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) that it enumerates.”).
144. Id. at 952; Slobogin, supra note 20, at 7.
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The analytical strands of both Olmstead and Katz converge in
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. Bucking decades of precedent,
Scalia chose a traditional property-based rationale to resolve the
issue: “The Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”145
Because the car was an “effect” and because the government
intruded upon the “effect” to obtain information, the majority found
a Fourth Amendment search.146 Reclaiming the trespass theory for
a more modern era,147 Justice Scalia explained:
The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close connection
to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to “the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures”; the phrase “in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects” would have been superfluous. Consistent with this
understanding, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied
to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th
century.148
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the conventional wisdom, and
the government’s argument before the Court, assumed that the
trespass theory had been superseded by the Katz standard, but
argued that “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”149 Thus, under the majority view, both avenues of analysis
145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
146. Id. at 949-50.
147. As Justice Alito stated in his concurrence, “The Court’s reasoning in this case is very
similar to that in the Court’s early decisions involving wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping, namely, that a technical trespass followed by the gathering of evidence
constitutes a search.” Id. at 959. 
148. Id. at 949-50 (citations omitted). “As explained, for most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon
the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.” Id. 
149. Id. at 947 (emphasis added); see also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“As the
majority’s opinion makes clear, however, Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded
it. Thus, ‘when the Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally
protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.’ ” (citations omitted)).
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remain available to determine a Fourth Amendment search. Left
unaddressed was whether a non-trespassory GPS tracking or equiv-
alent is a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.150
Jones generated two concurrences that attempted to think
through that unresolved question and challenged Justice Scalia’s
trespassory approach. First, Justice Sotomayor agreed with Scalia
that a trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area
constituted a search.151 But, she also reaffirmed the Katz standard
recognizing that not all government intrusions would require a
trespass.152 Turning to the precise question before the Court, Justice
Sotomayor then offered two new insights about the relationship
between surveillance technology and the Fourth Amendment in
public.
First, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the scale, aggregation,
and precision of intimate details revealed by surveillance technology
in public presented new challenges for the Fourth Amendment.153
She wrote:
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations. The Government can store such records and
efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And
because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously,
it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: “limited police resources and community
hostility.”
150. Id. at 954 (acknowledging that non-trespassory searches are not resolved by the
majority decision, but arguing that such “vexing problems” can be left to another day).
151. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion because I agree that a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here,
the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area.’ ” (alteration in original)).
152. Id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not
concerned only with trespassory intrusions on property. Rather, even in the absence of a
trespass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.’ ” (citations omitted)).
153. Id. at 955-56.
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Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects
of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS
monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a
substantial quantum of intimate information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and govern-
ment in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”154
Evoking the Olmstead dissent and Brandeis’s warning of an
unchecked surveillance state, in which all sorts of information is
subject to monitoring,155 the concurrence emphasized the heightened
concern with government scrutiny of intimate private aspects of our
identity—made evident by our public associations and actions.156 
Second, in an effort to redraw the Katz line for this type of public
surveillance, Justice Sotomayor offered a new test: “I would ask
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government
to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs,
sexual habits, and so on.”157 Presumably, if people do not expect this
aggregation to occur then the use of such a technique will be a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor did not
offer any sustained analysis of how this approach based on custom
and reasonable expectations would work, preferring to decide the
case on the narrower ground available.158
Justice Alito, writing for four Justices, analyzed the case under
the Katz standard, arguing that Katz allows the courts to address
the balancing of interests that arises when new technologies invade
private spaces.159 After a thorough critique of the trespassory theory
154. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
155. Justice Sotomayor even called into question some controlling Fourth Amendment
principles. Id. at 957 (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties.”).
156. Id. at 956 (cautioning against government collection of “private aspects of identity”).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 957.
159. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The best that we can do in this case is to apply
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a
particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have
2014] FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY IN PUBLIC 1311
adopted by the majority, Alito concluded that the tracking at issue
in Jones should be considered a Fourth Amendment search, but
short-term tracking or tracking for a more serious crime might
require a different analysis:
Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a
person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations
of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable. But the
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses,
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and
others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of
an individual’s car for a very long period.160
As Orin Kerr has pointed out, this test creates some ambiguity
as it only applies to long-term surveillance, and only certain types
of crimes.161 Justice Alito does not define those terms and instead
appears to invite legislatures to fill in the gaps of overseeing new
technologies.162 Alito concluded that the GPS monitoring in Jones
did constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, thus
providing five votes for a finding that long-term surveillance could
be considered a Fourth Amendment search under Katz.163
For purposes of this Article, United States v. Jones is important
for four major reasons. First, it confirms that current Fourth
Amendment doctrine has no easy answer to the problem of techno-
logical surveillance that does not involve a physical trespass.
Second, Jones reveals that five Justices believe that there exists
some Fourth Amendment protection of persons in public. Third,
several Justices appear dissatisfied with the existing Fourth
Amendment theories, necessitating new approaches to the problem.
Finally, Jones offers a preview of other problems that will soon
reach the Court involving even more sophisticated and more
invasive surveillance technologies. 
anticipated.”).
160. Id. (citation omitted).
161. Kerr, supra note 9, at 327.
162. Slobogin, supra note 20, at 36-37 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964).
163. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
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Simply stated, the doctrinal gap revealed by Jones will only
widen as a result of new technological surveillance advances.164
Jones represents the tip of the proverbial iceberg as new technolo-
gies will eviscerate traditional boundaries of sensory perception.
Constantly recording Google glasses,165 automated computer
response systems,166 biometric scans,167 omnipresent drones,168 and
a host of yet-to-be-created new technologies will be utilized by law
enforcement in the future. Reasonable expectations of privacy will
be hard to claim in a society of ubiquitous surveillance.169 Physical
trespass will be unnecessary with non-trespassory technologies.
New technological devices have and will continue to be able to see,
hear, smell, and touch citizens in ways that were simply impossible
in prior eras. Equally troubling, the data from these surveillance
techniques will be saved, aggregated, and datamined in a manner
that presents real concerns for individual freedom.170 These tech
164. See Taslitz, supra note 11, at 133 (“The Supreme Court has generally failed to see any
enhanced dangers to privacy caused by rapidly changing police surveillance technologies....
‘Privacy in public,’ especially on the street, is an oxymoron to this Court.”) (citations omitted).
165. Kashmir Hill, How Google Glasses Make a Persistent, Pervasive Surveillance State
Inevitable, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2012, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/
04/06/how-google-glasses-make-a-persistent-pervasive-surveillance-state-inevitable/.
166. David Hambling, The Future of Surveillance? When Automated Brains Keep Watch
24/7, POPULAR MECHANICS (May 26, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.
com/technology/how-to/computer-security/future-of-surveillance-cameras (discussing the
Automated Warning and Response Engine (AWARE) computer system that not only records
information but acts on information recorded, such as checking DMV records, from observed
license plates).
167. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database Of Biometrics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2007, at A1; Thomas Frank, Face Recognition Next in Terror Fight, USA TODAY (May 10,
2007, 8:49 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-05-10-facial-recog
nition-terrorism_N.htm; LAPD: We Know That Mug, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 26, 2004),
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/12/66142.
168. See supra note 2; see also Andy Pasztor, U.S. Skies Could See More Drones, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 4-5, 2012, at A7 (commenting on new Federal Aviation Administration regulations
that will increase domestic use of surveillance drones). But see Christine Clarridge, Seattle
Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://seattletimes.
com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddronesxml.html (commenting on the cessation of a
planned use of surveillance drones for domestic law enforcement after community complaints
about privacy). 
169. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 78 (2007).
170. E.g., Solove, supra note 59, at 1526 (“Massive and extensive government surveillance
in public raises many concerns for freedom and democracy. Surveillance gives extensive power
to the watchers. The government could develop a repository of information about citizens and
then use any instances of infraction as a pretext to attack people for things they say or for
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nological developments require a new framework to build consti-
tutional spaces of protection. The doctrinal tension begun in
Olmstead, continued in Katz, and debated in Jones opens the door
to a new Fourth Amendment analysis for the modern age. The next
three Parts develop and then apply the theory of personal curtilage
to this future problem. 
II. THE CURTILAGE PRINCIPLE
In the face of doctrinal uncertainty and technological advances,
it might seem odd to rely on the ancient concept of curtilage to build
a new theory of Fourth Amendment protection. Yet, curtilage offers
a historically grounded, constitutionally balanced, and flexible
framework to understand the core protections of the Fourth
Amendment.171 
Curtilage was first and foremost an acknowledged legal
fiction—designed to expand the area of personal protection beyond
the inside of a home.172 In addition, curtilage offered a limited pro-
tection in areas involving human, family, and associational intimacy
considered important to personal and political development.173
Finally, it was a personal and self-made barrier to governmental
and societal invasion.174 Curtilage had to be built, updated, and
their political beliefs and activities. The government could also use any embarrassing
information gleaned from surveillance to blackmail people. Government officials could leak
such information either through carelessness or to intentionally retaliate against a person or
smear them. Surveillance could chill speech, association, and other forms of dissent.”).
171. See United States v. Romano, 388 F. Supp. 101, 104 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (“The word
curtilage is derived from the Latin cohors (a place enclosed around a yard) and the old French
cortilliage or courtillage which today has been corrupted into courtyard. Originally it referred
to the land and outbuildings immediately adjacent to a castle that were in turn surrounded
by a high stone wall. Today its meaning has been extended to include any land or building
immediately adjacent to a dwelling. Usually it is enclosed some way by a fence or shrubs.”
(citations omitted)).
172. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also United States v. French, 291 F.3d
945, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (“This protection is not limited to the four walls of one’s home, but
extends to the curtilage of the home as well.”).
173. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (“The protection afforded the
curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most
heightened.”).
174. The wall had to be built, thus conveying symbolically and functionally a barrier
between the private and the public. 
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protected.175 It invested ownership in the right of personal pro-
tection with the individual seeking private sanctuary. As this Part
will discuss, although traditional curtilage has its limitations, it
offers an analytical framework to develop an enhanced protection
for people in public. 
The history of curtilage in America can be divided into two eras:
(1) the common law approach that was imported to America, and (2)
the “constitutionalizing” of the term in Supreme Court cases in-
volving the Fourth Amendment. This Part will discuss both stages,
followed by a brief section on how courts currently apply the
doctrine.
A. Common Law Understanding
The concept of curtilage arose out of the common law.176 British
law established certain defined property rights, the most important
of which was the preservation of real property interests.177 Property
law established physical boundaries, so that one property could be
distinguished from another.178 These boundaries traditionally includ-
ed an enclosure with a main house and grounds.179 The curtilage
area was understood as a subset of this property line, further
marked by a wall or a fence.180 Thus, man-made fence lines visually
and symbolically established the curtilage line of many English
properties.181
175. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
176. Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56
STAN. L. REV. 943, 946 (2004); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)
(“[T]he common law distinquished ‘open fields’ from the ‘curtilage,’ the land immediately
surrounding and associated with the home.” (citation omitted)).
177. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 21 (1975) (“The British state, all eighteenth-
century legislators agreed, existed to preserve the property and, incidentally, the lives and
liberties, of the propertied.”).
178. Peters, supra note 176, at 963 (“In England, because of several enclosure acts,
landholdings were traditionally surrounded by fences, walls, or hedgerows. These elements
compartmentalized the English landscape and made the boundary of the curtilage easy to
find.”) (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 952-53.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 952 (“In England, it was relatively simple to locate the curtilage boundary
because it was collinear with the wall that surrounded most dwellings.” (citing C.S. Parnell,
Annotation, Burglary: Outbuildings or the Like as Part of “Dwelling House,” 43 A.L.R.2d 831
(1955))).
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This line served several purposes. First, for criminal law pur-
poses, the curtilage line established the defining line for a common
law burglary.182 Entry into the curtilage area with the specific intent
to commit a felony constituted the crime of burglary.183 Defining the
line of the fence or wall became increasingly important to keep out
unwanted visitors. Second, the curtilage space served to protect
personal privacy.184 In an era without indoor plumbing—nec-
essitating outdoor facilities—and with big families in small houses,
people needed a space outside the walls of the house, but inside a
zone of privacy.185 Third, the curtilage line became important to
establish property lines to avoid property disputes over neighboring
lands.186 A clear demarcation allowed for open and notorious
ownership in an era when real property was a significant source of
wealth.187
This common law understanding of curtilage was duly brought
to America.188 The concept informed early cases, but ran into some
difficulty because of the different architectural landscape in the new
world.189 Specifically, curtilage lines were less well drawn in more
182. United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1996) (“At common law, curtilage
was the area outside the walls of a home from which theft at night amounted to burglary.”
(citation omitted)).
183. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223-25.
184. Gorman, 104 F.3d at 274 (“For the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, curtilage is
important because it extends to a larger area the right to privacy a person enjoys inside the
home: ‘[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of
doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.’ ” (citation omitted)).
185. Craven v. State, 111 So. 767, 771 (Ala. Ct. App. 1927) (“Curtilage usually includes the
yard, or garden, or field, which is near to, and used in connection with, the dwelling.... The
privy, barn, stable, cow-houses, dairy-houses, if they are parcel of the messuage, though they
are not under the same roof, or adjoining or contiguous to it, are included within the
curtilage.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
186. Of course, curtilage is not defined by property lines, and many property lines are far
more expansive than the actual curtilage area. The two terms are not coextensive.
187. Peters, supra note 176, at 977.
188. Id. at 946 (“The curtilage doctrine was imported with the common law from
England.”).
189. See, e.g., Armour v. State, 22 Tenn. 379, 385-86 (1842) (“The design is to protect the
peace and quiet of one’s place of abode by day and by night—and no extension of a principle,
enforced by such heavy penalties, ought to be made beyond what will give such protection in
a fair and adequate manner. To hold that every house which may be built in a curtilage or
courtyard of any extent, whether necessary to the enjoyment of the dwelling-house or not,
whether used for family purposes or not, and entirely disconnected from the mansion-house,
except by a common wall or fence, is part and parcel of the dwelling-house, is absurd—and not
warranted as we think by a fair construction of the cases—though, as has been observed, it
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urban city centers and more unsettled rural areas.190 These
definitional problems only increased as cities grew, houses shrunk,
and settlers occupied additional territories with vastly greater
acreage.191 Despite the difficulties in application, the term curtilage
has survived in usage from early common law, and makes appear-
ances throughout the case law in burglary cases, civil land disputes,
and negligence actions.192 These cases, however, did not address the
Fourth Amendment implications of a private space outside the
house. In fact, it was not until the 1920s that the Supreme Court
addressed the interrelation of curtilage and the Fourth
Amendment.193 
is difficult if not impossible to amalgamate them.”).
190. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 77 S.E. 657, 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1913) (“It has been several
times said by learned jurists that it was unfortunate that this term ‘curtilage,’ found in the
English statutes defining the offense of burglary, and which applies to the dwelling and the
houses surrounding the dwelling house in England, should have been perpetuated in the
statutes of our different states; for the term is not strictly applicable to the common
disposition of inclosures and buildings constituting the homestead of the inhabitants of this
country, and particularly of farmers. In England dwellings and outhouses of all kinds are
usually surrounded by a fence or stone wall, inclosing a small piece of land embracing the
yards and outbuildings near the house, constituting what is called the ‘court;’ and this
constitutes the curtilage of the dwelling house.”); Bare v. Commonwealth, 94 S.E. 168, 172
(Va. 1917) (“In England the curtilage seems to have included only the buildings within the
inner fence or yard, because there, in early times, for defense, the custom was to inclose [sic]
such place with a substantial wall. In this country, however, such walls or fences, in many
cases, do not exist, so that with us the curtilage includes the cluster of buildings constituting
the habitation or dwelling place, whether inclosed [sic] with an inner fence or not.”).
191. See Leonetti, supra note 14.
192. See, e.g., State v. Fierge, 673 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“[C]urtilage
includes all outbuildings used in connection with the residence, such as garages, sheds, barns,
yards, and lots connected with or in the close vicinity of the residence.”); Luman v. State, 629
P.2d 1275, 1276 (Okla. Crim. App.) (“Curtilage includes all outbuildings used in connection
with a residence, such as garages, sheds, [and] barns connected with and in close vicinity of
the residence.”), opinion corrected, 638 P.2d 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Brown v. Okla. City,
721 P.2d 1346, 1349 (Okla. Civ. App.) (“[C]urtilage ... includes, among other things, garages,
sheds, barns and the like.” (citation omitted)), cert. granted in part, amended opinion, 721
P.2d 1356 (Okla. 1986); State v. Lee, 253 P. 533, 534 (Or. 1927) (“Premises other than
dwellings have been held within the protection of the Fourth Amendment[,] for example a
barn. As construed by the courts from the earliest to the latest times, the words ‘dwelling’ or
‘dwelling house’ have been construed to include not only the main but all the cluster of
buildings convenient for the occupants of the premises, generally described as within the
curtilage.” (citation omitted)).
193. See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
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B. Modern Fourth Amendment Understanding
The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has addressed curtilage
to determine whether individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in particular areas of their property.194 The modern
definition of curtilage arises out of two cases: Oliver v. United
States195 and United States v. Dunn.196 These two cases provide the
framework for analysis, although lower courts applying the criteria
have come to strikingly inconsistent conclusions.197
Oliver involved the warrantless search by law enforcement
officers of Mr. Oliver’s fields. As described by the Supreme Court:
Arriving at the farm, [the officers] drove past petitioner’s house
to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign. A footpath led
around one side of the gate. The agents walked around the gate
and along the road for several hundred yards, passing a barn
and a parked camper. At that point, someone standing in front
of the camper shouted: “No hunting is allowed, come back up
here.” The officers shouted back that they were Kentucky State
Police officers, but found no one when they returned to the
camper. The officers resumed their investigation of the farm and
found a field of marihuana over a mile from petitioner’s home.198
The Court had to determine whether the warrantless search of
the field of marijuana plants warranted Fourth Amendment
protection. Relying on Hester v. United States,199 the Court held that
such an area fell outside the curtilage area and within “open fields,”
where Mr. Oliver lacked Fourth Amendment protection.200
194. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
450-52 (1989); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1987); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 235-39 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984); Hester,
265 U.S. at 59.
195. 466 U.S. 170.
196. 480 U.S. 294.
197. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 949 (2010) (“[U]ncertainty exists in the present
doctrine, particularly as it is implemented by the lower courts: there is currently significant
ambiguity for law enforcement as to whether areas are protected curtilage or unprotected
open fields.”).
198. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
199. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. 
200. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
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Oliver is understood to have established that “open fields” fall
outside the curtilage and thus outside the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.201 At the same time, implicit in this reasoning is that
areas within the curtilage are afforded heightened protection. As the
Court stated, “an individual may not legitimately demand privacy
for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area
immediately surrounding the home.”202 The Court reasoned that
“open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance.”203 Further, the Court easily dismissed
issues of line drawing about what separates open fields from
curtilage: “[F]or most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be
clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage—as the
area around the home to which the activity of home life extends—is
a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.”204 
Whereas Oliver exists as the Court’s first real engagement with
the interrelation of curtilage and the Fourth Amendment, Dunn
converted the Court’s discussion into a constitutional test.205 Dunn,
which also involved a search of a suspect’s property for illegal
narcotics, presented the question of whether a barn located fifty
yards from a fence surrounding a ranch house was within its
curtilage.206 If so, law enforcement’s warrantless search was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
To answer the question of whether the barn fell within the
curtilage of the property, the Court adopted a four-part test that
201. See id. (using the term “open fields”).
202. Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
203. Id. at 179-80 (“Curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated
with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ and therefore has been considered
part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
204. Id. at 182 n.12.
205. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (“[In Oliver] we recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the curtilage is
determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the
area in question should be treated as the home itself.” (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180)); Tracey
Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-
First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 63 (2002) (“United States v. Dunn elevated Oliver’s dicta on
the meaning of curtilage to law.” (citation omitted)).
206. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297-98, 301 (1987).
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remains the test today.207 The Dunn test asks: (1) how close the
claimed curtilage is to the home; (2) whether the area and the home
share a common fence or barrier; (3) how the residents use the area;
and (4) what steps the resident took to protect the area from
observation by passersby.208 These four factors led the Court to
determine that the barn—which was at some distance to the house,
was outside the common enclosure, was used for drug manufactur-
ing, and was not visibly marked off—did not fall within the
curtilage.209 Further, the Court emphasized that it was “especially
significant that the law enforcement officials possessed objective
data indicating that the [area] was not being used for intimate
activities of the home.”210
Proximity to a protected space thus guides modern curtilage
decisions because such spaces are naturally connected to intimacy
and personal activities.211 In those spaces, people and families can
naturally grow and develop, free from government oversight.212 
207. Id. at 301 (“Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience of the
lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home’s curtilage, we
believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors:
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included
within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put,
and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing
by.”).
208. Id. at 301-03.
209. Id. at 302-03.
210. Id. at 302.
211. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (“The protection afforded the
curtilage is essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most
heightened.”); Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky. 2008) (“The fact that the
curtilage as well as the home itself is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection and an
expectation of privacy is premised on strong concepts of intimacy, autonomy, and sanctuary
that develop around home and family life, and the fact that many related activities will occur
outside the house.” (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984))).
212. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 n.4 (1987) (“Fencing configurations are important factors in
defining the curtilage, but, as we emphasize above, the primary focus is whether the area in
question harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of
the home.” (citation omitted)); Taslitz, supra note 11, at 158 (“Apart from its role of promoting
citizen involvement in political movements, privacy also encourages the diversity and
autonomy purportedly valued by liberal states, because privacy frees citizens from the
‘tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling.’ ” (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11
(Haldeman-Julius 1925) (1859)); see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 342-43 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[If the] ‘physical curtilage of the home [is
protected it] ... is surely ... a result of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within,’ so
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In evaluating curtilage, courts also examine the nature and uses
to which the area is put as a means of determining whether it is a
space that deserves heightened protection.213 Hence, courts provide
homes with the utmost protection, with levels of privacy afforded
decreasing as distance from the home’s internal sanctuary in-
creases.214
Finally, courts look to physical markers of an area—the
enclosure—and steps taken to protect the area from observation,
both of which serve to exclude others from surveillance.215 Courts
too the constitutional protection for the human body is surely inseparable from concern for
the mind and spirit that dwell therein.” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting))).
213. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 191 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The
uses to which a place is put are highly relevant to the assessment of a privacy interest
asserted therein. If, in light of our shared sensibilities, those activities are of a kind in which
people should be able to engage without fear of intrusion by private persons or government
officials, we extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to the space in question, even in
the absence of any entitlement derived from positive law.” (citations omitted)); Comm. to
Oppose the Annexation of Topside and Louisville Rd. v. City of Alcoa, 881 S.W.2d 269, 272
(Tenn. 1994) (“Although commonly discussed in Fourth Amendment terms, curtilage is
defined in 25 C.J.S., as having a well defined legal meaning in the administration of both civil
and criminal law. In terms of use ‘curtilage’ is defined as a space necessary and convenient
and habitually used for the family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employments; the
space of ground adjoining the dwelling house, used in connection therewith in the conduct of
family affairs and for carrying on domestic purposes; the ground adjacent to a dwelling house
and used in connection therewith; the yard, or the garden, or field which is near to, and used
in connection with, the dwelling.” (citation omitted)).
214. See, e.g., Jacob v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 531 F.3d 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2008); Widgren
v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2005); Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654,
661 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding a barn to be part of the curtilage as “[c]urious friends and
neighbors, much less a government agent with a mission, would be expected to keep out”
(citation omitted)); Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 601-03 (6th Cir. 1998); see
also Stern, supra note 34, at 940 (“Privacy of intimate association disregards the physical
home in favor of assessing the likelihood that search activity will disrupt domestic life,
engender interpersonal conflict, reveal personal information that is private to and constitutive
of relationships, and chill socialization and intimacy.”).
215. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Individuals who
seek privacy can take precautions, tailored to the location of the road, to avoid disclosing
private activities to those who pass by. They can build a tall fence, for example, and thus
ensure private enjoyment of the curtilage without risking public observation from the road
or sidewalk. If they do not take such precautions, they cannot reasonably expect privacy from
public observation.”); Hancock, supra note 26, at 556 (discussing Justice Powell’s dissent in
Ciraolo: “The connotation of security delivered a portrait of the psychological states of feeling
safe from danger and fear, while the concept of freedom conjured images of behavior, such as
ease of movement, frankness of speech, and the power to act without subjection to the power
of the government.”) (citations omitted).
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examine the symbolic, and sometimes literal, markers of exclusion
in their analysis.216 Of course, merely marking off an area will not
by itself control the analysis.217 In fact, in two aerial search cases,
the Supreme Court has found no expectation of privacy in spaces
within the curtilage area, even when marked by enclosures and
protections.218 But, to claim any Fourth Amendment protection, the
area must, at a minimum, be intentionally marked to exclude
others. 
Florida v. Jardines confirms that curtilage remains a doctrine
applicable to a modern Fourth Amendment.219 The majority opinion
authored by Justice Scalia reiterated that the central reason why a
police dog’s sniff of a home constituted a “search” was because it
occurred on the curtilage of the home.220 Justice Scalia reasoned
that “the curtilage of the house ... enjoys protection as part of the
home itself.”221 He emphasized that the reason for this protection is
that “[t]his area around the home is intimately linked to the home,
both physically and psychologically, and is where privacy expecta-
tions are most heightened.”222 This protection is not just one of
physical security, but also the ability to avoid observation from a
constitutionally protected space: “The right to retreat would be
significantly diminished if the police could enter a man’s property
216. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 213 (2007) (“A typical reason for
enclosing the curtilage adjacent to a structure is to keep out unwanted visitors—especially
those with criminal motives.”).
217. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173, 179 (allowing officers to ignore a posted “No Trespassing”
sign at the farm’s locked gate because “[i]t is not generally true that fences or ‘No Trespassing’
signs effectively bar the public from viewing open fields in rural areas”); State v. Clark, 859
P.2d 344, 350 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (“[A] ‘no trespassing’ sign ‘cannot reasonably be
interpreted to exclude normal, legitimate inquiries or visits.’ ”); State v. McIntyre, 860 P.2d
299, 303 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (Riggs, J., dissenting) (decrying “that citizens cannot exclude
casual visitors without posted warnings and a fence and a moat filled with crocodiles”); State
v. Hornback, 871 P.2d 1075, 1078-79 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
218. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-51; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-14 (1986).
219. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
220. Id. at 1413, 1415, 1417-18 (“As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their
feet and all four of their companion’s firmly planted on the constitutionally protected
extension of Jardines’ home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even
implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.”).
221. Id. at 1414; see also id. (“We therefore regard the area immediately surrounding and
associated with the home—what our cases call the curtilage—as part of the home itself for
Fourth Amendment purposes.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. Id. at 1415 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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to observe his repose from just outside the front window.”223 This
curtilage-focused rationale garnered the votes of five Justices and
will likely continue to guide analysis in future cases. 
1. Traditional Trespass
Curtilage, as a constitutionally protected space, has traditionally
been tied to the concept of trespass. The curtilage wall acted as a
natural barrier to prevent physical entry near the home. Before
modern technology, police had to physically enter the curtilage in
order to obtain information or observe activities within that
protected space.224 There was simply no other way to get the
information. As modern sense-enhancing devices did not exist, a
requirement of physical invasion made a logical and easy line to
determine a violation of this secure space. As Justice Scalia said in
Jones:
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose
of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical
intrusion would have been considered “a search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.225
Under a traditional analysis, the relationship between curtilage
and trespass made Fourth Amendment line drawing rather
223. Id. at 1414.
224. See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1095-96 (2011)
(“Principally, trespass law is a stringent form of liability applied to nonpermissive entries onto
the land of another. Generally, a cause of action may lie for trespass to land even if the
defendant’s trespass does not cause harm and may even include incidents where the
trespasser was unaware that he or she was entering the land owned by another.”) (citations
omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965) (“One who intentionally
enters land in the possession of another is subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass,
although his presence on the land causes no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing
or person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest.”); id. § 217 (defining
trespass to chattels as “intentionally ... dispossessing another of the chattel, ... or using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another”).
225. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); see also George C. Thomas III,
Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
199, 224 (2010) (“So, for example, the law of trespass recognized what courts now call
‘curtilage.’ ”).
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straightforward.226 If police obtained the information without
physical invasion—through unaided senses—it was not a Fourth
Amendment violation. If police obtained information through a
physical invasion, it was a Fourth Amendment violation. Because
curtilage was considered a protected constitutional space, and the
owner of the curtilage had the right to exclude others from that
space,227 any physical invasion of that space was a trespass and thus
a Fourth Amendment violation. 
2. Trespass Reconsidered
The scholarly work of Orin Kerr has recently upended this
understanding, uncovering that the traditional “trespass theory”
discussed in several Supreme Court cases never really existed.228 As
Professor Kerr explains, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden229 and Katz referred to a prior adoption of a trespass theory,
which the Court had never actually adopted.230 Instead, early court
decisions relied on a mixture of “property, privacy, and policy
concerns”231 with some cases establishing a much broader protection
than physical trespass.232 Although property interests were
influential in deciding the cases, a strict trespass theory had never
been adopted. As Kerr concludes, “The history of the Fourth
Amendment search doctrine brings us to a surprising conclusion:
Jones purports to restore a trespass test that never previously
existed.”233 
226. See Thomas, supra note 225, at 229-31.
227. Depoorter, supra note 224, at 1095 (“American property law reserves a relatively
stringent doctrinal framework for trespass law, since an act of trespass is considered to be the
most express violation of a landowner’s fundamental right to exclude others from his or her
property.”) (citations omitted).
228. See Kerr, supra note 18, at 2 (“This essay explores the history of the Fourth
Amendment and reaches the surprising conclusion that no trespass test was used in the pre-
Katz era. Neither the original understanding nor Supreme Court doctrine equated searches
with trespass. Jones purports to revive a test that did not actually exist.”). 
229. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
230. Kerr, supra note 18, at 86-90 (discussing the creation of the “trespass myth”). 
231. Id. at 69.
232. See id. at 78 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), to show that the
Fourth Amendment protected “all invasions” of the “privacies of life”). 
233. Id. at 90. 
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That Justice Scalia studiously avoided using the term “trespass”
in his majority Jardines opinion, after heavily relying on it in Jones,
supports Professor Kerr’s argument.234 At the same time, however,
the concurring and dissenting Justices in Jardines did use the term
“trespass” to describe the search at issue.235 Thus, like much of the
Fourth Amendment, it appears the trespass connection to curtilage
also remains muddled and in need of clarification. 
C. Open Questions About Trespass
Despite curtilage’s currency in the modern Fourth Amendment
doctrine, a question remains to be answered in mapping out the
relationship between curtilage and trespass. This uncertainty
centers on the level of protection the curtilage area should receive
from sense-enhancing technology. 
A few points are clear. After Jardines, curtilage is protected from
physical entry—“physically intruding.”236 Further, after Florida v.
Riley and California v. Ciraolo, curtilage is not protected from plain-
view observations.237 But, left unresolved is what level of protection
curtilage should have from sense-enhancing technologies that reveal
intimate details that could not be observed with the naked eye.238 In
other words, are persons in the curtilage of their home protected
from sense-enhancing technologies that reveal information—es-
234. Professor Kerr’s article was published in 2012 between the decisions in Jones and
Jardines.
235. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Was this
activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds today.”); id. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“According to the Court, however, the police officer in this case ... committed a trespass.”).
But see id. at 1420 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision in this important Fourth
Amendment case is based on a putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found in the
annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence.”). 
236. See id. at 1417-18.
237. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-
14 (1986); see Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Here, police officers came
to Joelis Jardines’ door with a super-sensitive instrument, which they deployed to detect
things inside that they could not perceive unassisted.”).
238. If, for example, law enforcement had a more sophisticated device that could “sniff” for
narcotics from an area outside of the curtilage, it is not clear whether Justice Scalia’s
curtilage-based rationale would protect the homeowner. Under a reasonable expectation of
privacy test, see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001), such a device would likely be
a search under the Fourth Amendment; but it is not yet resolved whether the Court would
consider such a technology the equivalent to a physical invasion. 
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pecially activities—that could not be observed by law enforcement
using their ordinary senses?
Although admittedly an open question, this Article chooses to
expand curtilage protection to include invasions of intimate
activities by sense-enhancing technologies. Justice Scalia’s state-
ment in Jardines, that courts must protect curtilage as they do
homes, provides the initial justification for this argument.239 Cases
like Oliver and Florida v. Riley also specifically recognize that
protected activities occur in the curtilage.240 This equivalence makes
sense when thinking about new surveillance technologies. If
sensitive audio surveillance technology can listen through walls, it
should not matter if I whisper a secret to my wife on our front porch
curtilage or in our bedroom. The technology can hear both. Without
the technology neither conversation could be overheard. Thus, both
activities should be equally protected if they cannot be heard by
ordinary “plain hearing” means, but only through physical invasion
of property or its equivalent, that is, sense-enhancing capture.
Precedent does not require a contrary answer. None of the prior
Supreme Court cases that address observation—as opposed to
physical invasion—into the curtilage area involve sense-enhancing
technologies.241 Even the over-flight cases involve police officers
looking with their ordinary, unenhanced vision to observe the
contraband at issue.242 With the exception perhaps of Dow Chemical
involving surveillance of an industrial commercial complex,243 there
is no case that allows sense-enhancing invasion of protected
constitutional spaces like the curtilage. Thus, to keep the level of
protection consistent, curtilage, like the inside of a home, should be
239. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (“The officers were gathering information in an area
belonging to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house—in the curtilage of the house,
which we have held enjoys protection as part of the home itself.”).
240. Oliver explicitly discussed “intimate activities” and privacy for “activities” conducted
in the immediate area of the home. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984). The
Court in Florida v. Riley held that no search occurred partly because “no intimate details
connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed.” 488 U.S. at 452.
241. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 447-48; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
242. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 447-48; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
243. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (“While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an industrial
complex in Dow Chemical, we noted that we found ‘it important that this is not an area
immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened.’ ”
(citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986))).
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protected from sense-enhancing observations that reveal things not
observable with ordinary senses. 
For purposes of this Article, curtilage will be understood to
protect both physical invasion and sense-enhanced invasion of a
constitutionally protected space. It expands the fiction and creates
a flexible rule that provides a security-based rationale that mixes
property rights, privacy rights, and autonomy rights consistent with
a muddled Fourth Amendment history.
D. Current Reality of Curtilage in the Courts
The roots of common law curtilage are long but shallow. The
theory remains good law, and yet, in application, protection of the
curtilage has been rather limited. Courts have not been protective
of curtilage areas observable by aerial surveillance.244 Numerous
federal and state cases have found no protection of curtilage due to
the configuration of the property or limits to the apparent privacy
expectation of the property owners.245 As discussed, the Supreme
Court’s own line drawing provides no comfort for those expecting
robust privacy in such areas. Curtilage exists as an organizing
principle of Fourth Amendment law with limited practical strength.
Yet, curtilage has value as an organizing principle. For purposes
of this Article, I consider curtilage less of a fixed area of protection
than a recognition that the law is willing to expand protection
beyond the four walls of an enclosed home.246 In seeing the possibil-
ity of expanding the concept of curtilage from an emphasis on
property to an emphasis on personal security in public, it offers new
avenues for analysis. As the next Part will discuss, freed from this
property law background, the concept of personal curtilage provides
244. See, e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[If the
officer had] physically invaded the curtilage to make his observation, that would have
constituted a search subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis
added); United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 774 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Visual inspection from
a lawful vantage point, however, is quite different from the physical assault on defendants’
backyard that occurred in this case.”).
246. The Dunn Court, in acknowledging the case-by-case nature of the analysis, also
recognized that there could be no bright line rule imposed. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 301 n.4 (1987).
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the foundation for a new theory of security from invasive surveil-
lance in public.
III. THE THEORY OF PERSONAL CURTILAGE
The theory of personal curtilage in public involves four princi-
ples. First, persons can build a constitutionally protected space
secure from governmental surveillance. Second, a person must mark
that space in some symbolic manner to claim it as secure from
governmental surveillance. Third, these spaces must be related to
areas of personal autonomy or intimate connection, whether
personal, familial, or associational. Fourth, these contested
spaces—like traditional curtilage—will be evaluated by objectively
balancing these factors to determine if a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred. Building on the framework of traditional curtilage, a
physical or sense-enhancing intrusion into this protected personal
curtilage would be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.247 
This Part sets out the legal and historical justifications for this
theory, focusing on how personal curtilage expands Fourth Amend-
ment protection to persons in public who can establish: (1) a
defensible space; (2) a claimed space; and (3) an intimacy-protecting
space; which (4) can be balanced within existing Fourth Amendment
principles. Part IV will then apply this theory to the modern
problem of enhanced technological surveillance. 
A. Security from Government Surveillance: A Defensible Space
A theory of personal curtilage grounds itself in the primacy of
“security”248 and not “privacy” as the operative protection of the
Fourth Amendment.249 Because the theory aims to define a space
constitutionally defensible from privacy-destroying technologies, it
247. See Part IV infra for application.
248. Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not guarantee a right of privacy. It guarantees—if its actual words mean
anything—a right of security.”) (footnote omitted).
249. As other scholars have recognized, security provides a stronger conceptual framework
to carve out individual protections from government surveillance. See Casey, supra note 105,
at 982 (“[R]eclaiming the language of security will provide greater clarity and guidance in our
analysis of Fourth Amendment issues.”) (citation omitted); Clancy, supra note 10 (arguing
that security is the proper frame to analyze Fourth Amendment protections).
1328 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1283
must first explain why this space should be protected by the Fourth
Amendment at all. The argument proceeds in four steps, looking
briefly at the text, history, law, and values behind a security-focused
Fourth Amendment. Each step supports the overarching theory that
the Fourth Amendment includes a limited right of security to defend
against government intrusion, even in public.250
As a matter of Fourth Amendment language, the text speaks to
a right to be “secure” against unreasonable searches and seizures.251
Unlike a reasonable expectation of privacy, a reasonable claim to
security from governmental surveillance defines itself not by what
it protects, but from what it excludes. To be secure from an unrea-
sonable search or seizure means that a barrier exists between the
people and the government, a space that cannot be invaded without
constitutionally adequate justification.252
250. Thomas K. Clancy, The Importance of James Otis, 82 MISS. L.J. 487, 498 (2013) (“The
Fourth Amendment seems indispensible to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal securi-
ty, personal liberty, and private property.”) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895, at 748 (1833)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
251. The Fourth Amendment uses the word “secure” to define the right protected. It was
borrowed from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which served as the model for the
Fourth Amendment. See 10 SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 28 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959);
Casey, supra note 105, at 982 (“The interests that courts since Katz have described in terms
of a reasonable expectation of privacy should be expressed in terms of personal security and
the right to be secure”) (citation omitted); Nowlin, supra note 52, at 1052 (“The word ‘secure’
in the text is closely associated with the phrase ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.’ The
guarantee of ‘security’ is extended to four enumerated interests: ‘the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’ ”).
252. See Clancy, supra note 250, at 505 (“The ability to exclude is so essential to the
exercise of the right to be secure that it is proper to say that it is equivalent to the right—the
right to be secure is the right to exclude. Without the ability to exclude, a person has no
security. With the ability to exclude, a person has all that the Fourth Amendment promises:
no unjustified intrusions by the government. In other words, the Fourth Amendment gives
the right to say, ‘No,’ to the government’s attempts to search and seize.”); Clancy, supra note
10, at 362 (“Defining security as having the right to exclude has historical roots and meaning;
the Framers lived in a time that equated security with the ability to exclude. It provides an
easily identified and applied rule designed to protect an individual’s right to be safe as to his
or her person, house, papers, and effects.”).
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As a matter of history, one can trace the emphasis on security
through the speeches and documents of the founding generation.
Founding leaders such as James Otis,253 John Adams,254 and James
Madison255 emphasized the constitutional principle of security from
government intrusion. The paramount concern of arbitrary govern-
mental investigation necessitated a focus on regulating government
intrusions into public and private space.256 Although history has
established the primacy of the security of the home, this is not an
exclusive protection.257 The Founders also valued travel, communi-
cation, associational freedoms, and personal liberty even outside the
confines of the farm or homestead.258 As Justice Scalia acknowl-
253. Clancy, supra note 250, at 487-88, 496 (quoting James Otis’s famous speech on the
Writs of Assistance in which he articulated a right to be secure and that this right of security
was a foundational principle of the Founding generation: “[E]very householder in this
province, will necessarily become less secure than he was before this writ had any existence
among us”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 491 (“The
absolute liberties of Englishmen, as frequently declared in Parliament, are principally three:
1. The right of personal security, 2. personal liberty, and 3. private property.”) (quoting James
Otis, A Vindication of the British Colonies, in PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 558
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965)).
254. Clancy, supra note 53, at 1001-02 (demonstrating that in his correspondence with
William Tudor, Adams acknowledged that Otis “examined the acts of trade and demonstrated
that ... ‘they destroyed all our security of property, liberty, and life.’ ”) (citation omitted); id.
at 1059 (“Certain qualities in those objects valued: the right to be secure. Adams and his
contemporaries repeatedly used the concept of ‘security’ to describe the quality of the right
protected as to each person’s life, liberty, and property.”) (citation omitted).
255. Id. at 1045 (noting that Madison spoke of the “security against general warrants”)
(quoting Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, 319 n.I, 320 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)); id. at 1046 n.402 (“Madison, in his address
to the House of Representatives, repeatedly used variations on the concept of ‘security’ as the
underlying concern. Hence, he asserted, amendments were needed to ‘expressly declare the
great rights of mankind secured under this Constitution.’ As another example, he stated that
the Bill of Rights would ‘provide those securities for liberty which are required by a part of
the community’ and that it would ‘incorporate those provisions for the security of rights.’ ”)
(citations omitted).
256. Ku, supra note 130, at 1335-36.
257. Stern, supra note 34, at 935-36 (“Residential property was an important privacy
concern in the Founding Era, but it was not the only important concern. Mail and writings
were a particularly strong focus of early colonial privacy rights.... Judicial opinions of that era
observed that ‘papers are often the dearest property a man can have,’ and commentators
charged that the paramount harm in residential search was having a man’s ‘desks broken
open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity.’ ”) (citations omitted).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1965); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900). See generally Gregory B.
Hartch, Comment, Wrong Turns: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Right to Travel Cases, 21
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 471-72 (1995).
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edged in Jones, the Fourth Amendment would have been violated if
a constable had secreted himself in an eighteenth-century coach and
learned where the coach had traveled in public.259 
As discussed earlier, the evolution of Fourth Amendment law
has followed an uneven path throughout the last century.260 Yet, the
Supreme Court has come back to the theme of “security” over and
over. This theme has informed the Court in analyzing protections of
papers,261 homes,262 persons,263 and setting out the overarching
principle that the Fourth Amendment protects some spaces,264 be
they constitutionally protected areas,265 property-based areas,266 or
259. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012) (“There is no doubt that the
information gained by that trespassory activity would be the product of an unlawful
search—whether that information consisted of the conversations occurring in the coach, or
of the destinations to which the coach traveled.”).
260. See supra Part I; see also Nowlin, supra note 52, at 1056 (“The Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence of earlier days did not always emphasize the precise terminology of ‘security’
over that of ‘reasonableness,’ but it did regularly define ‘reasonableness’ in the Fourth
Amendment in light of the common-law background of property rights which form the
foundation of the traditional view of ‘security’ in protected interests.”) (citations omitted).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 618 (1885) (recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment issue presented “a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the
personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen”).
262. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Security of the home must be guarded by the law in a world where privacy is diminished by
enhanced surveillance and sophisticated communication systems.”).
263. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550 (1980) (“The Fourth
Amendment provides that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....’ There
is no question in this case that the respondent possessed this constitutional right of personal
security as she walked through the Detroit Airport, for ‘the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.’ ”).
264. See Nowlin, supra note 52, at 1061-62 (“Justice Ginsburg, the lone dissenter in
[Kentucky v.] King, countered the majority’s ‘reasonableness’ analysis by building much of her
analysis of the issue around the rival concept of ‘security’ as supported by text, tradition, and
precedent from the ‘security’ era.... In framing her argument, Justice Ginsburg reoriented the
‘reasonableness’ frame toward ‘security’ by specially emphasizing the security language in the
Fourth Amendment: The Fourth Amendment guarantees to the people [t]he right ... to be
secure in their ... houses ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.”) (alteration in
original).
265. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (“What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile.
There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts
something in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know
it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure.” (footnote omitted)).
266. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1927) (“The well known
2014] FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY IN PUBLIC 1331
expectations of privacy. This protection explicitly has been seen in
the Court’s protection of property.267 But the logic also covers
persons outside of their homes or property. As part of the Fourth
Amendment, individuals retain the right to take steps to exclude
others from portions of their lives.268 This defensible space—as both
metaphor and physical reality—like the traditional curtilage wall,
excludes others from entry, observation, or interference and thus
deserves some constitutional protection.
B. Markers of Protected Space: A Claimed Space
A theory of personal curtilage must next articulate how to mark
those areas from which an individual may exclude the government.
Like traditional curtilage, an examination of personal curtilage
looks at what the person has done to claim the space.269 Like
traditional curtilage, personal curtilage looks to see what physical
or symbolic walls have been created to establish a protected space
free from government surveillance. This is a function both of law
and custom, but unlike the expectation of privacy analysis, the focus
is on the individual’s affirmative actions taken to demonstrate a
desire to exclude.270 
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment ... was to prevent the use of governmental force
to search a man’s house, his person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure
against his will.”).
267. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The owner of property ... has a right to exclude from it all the world,
including the Government, and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own purposes.
When the Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to that property, it infringes
that exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted the property to its own use.”);
David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: A
Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 58 (2000) (“The right of a
landowner to exclude others is a fundamental part of the equally fundamental Constitutional
Right to the enjoyment of private property.”).
268. See Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 341 (“The core value is, in essence, an interest in
secrecy—in not having the details of our lives learned or exposed against our wishes. The
Framers prized this aspect of ‘the right to be let alone’ as an essential foundation of a free
society, and gave it a central place among the basic liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights.”).
269. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
270. As this Article will discuss, this is more than merely the subjective expectation of
privacy as understood in Katz. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,
J., concurring). Instead, it involves objective actions that demonstrate that expectation of
security.
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Personal curtilage requires a claimed space. In everyday life, we
take steps to protect our personal information from being
revealed.271 We wear clothes in public, carry our papers and
belongings in opaque bags and briefcases, encrypt our emails, seal
letters, whisper when telling a secret, and lock our homes when we
are not in them. These actions have a utility in that they minimize
the amount of information provided in public; but in an era of
sophisticated technological surveillance, they are relatively useless
in maintaining actual privacy. X-ray scanning technology can see
through our clothes and identify objects in our bags. Anyone can
open our letters or intercept our e-mail. Audio enhancement can
capture whispered conversations as if they were shouted across a
street. Houses can be entered by skilled intruders, as well as
common burglars. Thus, clear definitional markers to exclude or
defend an area, and not the possibility of invasion, define security
within a theory of personal curtilage.
Of course, some of this space naturally arises from existing law.
One of the reasons that we have a sense of security in our belong-
ings, mail, conversations, and homes is that laws exist to protect
those areas.272 Another reason is that custom and practice have
traditionally carved out an area that is respected by others.273 
The theory of personal curtilage builds on this analysis by
requiring that the individual take an affirmative step to signify se-
curity.274 This requirement goes beyond merely having a subjective
271. Jim Harper, Escaping Fourth Amendment Doctrine After Jones: Physics, Law, and
Privacy Protection, 2011-2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 219, 220.
272. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Federal Wiretap Act) of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22
(2006)); Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards
in State Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity,
9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 487, 533-34 (2011). The Court recognized the protection of letters in
the mail as far back as the Boyd case. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
273. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of
privacy by law must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.”); Farahany, supra note 117, at 1241 (“Government investigations to
obtain information implicate the Fourth Amendment only if the investigation intrudes upon
the lawful privacy interests of individuals. Those interests—individuals’ ‘reasonable
expectations of privacy’—depend on the interests that society recognizes through law and
custom.”).
274. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (Mont. 1995) (“We conclude that in Montana a
person may have an expectation of privacy in an area of land that is beyond the curtilage
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expectation of privacy, as would be the first step in the Katz
analysis.275 Instead, it involves objective and observable steps taken
to claim that protected space.276 Under a personal curtilage theory,
the individual must affirmatively act to demonstrate the equivalent
expectation of security. If, for example, a person takes precautions
to secure communications in public, say by whispering or using a
scrambling device, then the analysis turns not on subjective
expectations, but the objective actions taken to ensure security.
Even if others could still hear the conversation through an obviously
placed, sophisticated listening device, such that an expectation of
privacy would be unreasonable, the attempt to exclude prying ears
would control the analysis. 
Placing the burden on the individual to assert a constitutional
right against the government creates an interesting tension with
the ordinary analysis of constitutional rights. From one perspective,
such an assertion should be unnecessary because the Fourth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights exist as bulwarks against
government overreaching.277 In a government truly of limited
powers, police would not have the surveillance powers to invade
privacy or security unless there was a law specifically allowing it.
Such is not the current reality of the Fourth Amendment.278 No
which the society of this State is willing to recognize as reasonable, and that where that
expectation is evidenced by fencing, ‘No Trespassing,’ or similar signs, or ‘by some other
means [which] indicate[s] unmistakably that entry is not permitted,’ entry by law enforcement
officers requires permission or a warrant.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). Some
state courts even provide greater protection for open areas beyond the curtilage if the owner
has taken affirmative steps to mark off the area as private. State v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 868
(Vt. 1998) (recognizing, under state constitutional law, that affirmative steps to obtain privacy
in open fields will factor into the expectations of privacy of land beyond the curtilage).
275. Although it is quite similar to the Katz standard that “what [an individual] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The emphasis here is the
language “seeks to preserve,” and the manner in which one has manifested an objective desire
to preserve something as private. Again, going back to the facts of Katz, it was the shutting
of the telephone booth door that manifested an objective desire to keep the conversation
private. Id. at 352. It was not the place—outside the house—or the content—illegal
betting—but the steps taken to demonstrate a private space that controlled. Id.
276. Taking the facts of Katz as our example again, it was the closing of the door and
paying the toll to use the phone that marked out a space or a barrier from others. Id.
277. See Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of Rights as Limited
Government Provisions, 62 SMU L. REV. 1745, 1748, 1771 (2009).
278. See Eric Y. Kizirian, Comment, Manipulating the Fourth Amendment: The Expectation
of Privacy in Luggage Aboard a Commercial Bus, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 109, 130-31 (1999) (“Many
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Fourth Amendment violation occurs unless a court finds that a
search took place based on a violation of property or a protected
expectation of privacy.279 Thus, individuals do need to mark out
spaces of constitutional security.280 “We the people” are required to
draw those lines. In an all-pervasive surveillance state, individuals
will need to take back control of constitutionally protected security
by establishing limits on government surveillance.281 
As this Article will discuss in Part IV, how individuals claim
that space varies depending on the activity and technology at issue.
Whispering may protect communications, but would not protect
against visual surveillance. Clothing may protect property in a
pocket against visual surveillance, but not against scent detectors
searching for chemical agents. Each area may need to be marked
differently depending on the circumstances. Defining those markers,
like the precise boundaries of a curtilage wall, is easy in the abstract
and difficult in application.
C. Relationship to Personal Detail: An Intimacy-Protecting Space
Traditional curtilage sheltered personal growth and activities
from societal and governmental surveillance in order to promote
autonomy and intimacy.282 As the Supreme Court stated in Oliver,
“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and
commentators express concern over the growing exceptions to permissible Fourth Amendment
searches. In an effort to win the war on drugs, courts have been very generous in their
tolerance of increasing police intrusions into the constitutionally protected rights of
individuals. But failure to limit law enforcement’s ability to conduct warrantless searches
compromises the integrity of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Contrary to
their recent roles as facilitators of expanding Fourth Amendment exceptions, the traditional
role of the courts was to ‘guard against overzealous law enforcement.’ ”) (citations omitted)
(quoting Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986)).
279. See Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 341.
280. See Ku, supra note 130, at 1326 (“The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy.
This is not to say that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do with privacy—the
amendment clearly addresses privacy, or more precisely, the right of the people to be secure.
Rather, the amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the people’s authority
over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when government may
intrude into the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.”) (footnote omitted).
281. See id.
282. See supra note 115.
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the privacies of life,’ and therefore has been considered part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”283 Although these
activities typically took place in the home, the values of personal
and familial intimacy extended beyond the walls of the home.284 
This focus on personal and intimate detail has generated a
continuing debate on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections
around the home.285 For example, in Florida v. Riley, the Supreme
Court reasoned that helicopter surveillance into curtilage was not
a search in part because “no intimate details connected with the use
of the home or curtilage were observed.”286 But then in Kyllo, the
Supreme Court held that for homes, which under current Fourth
Amendment doctrine includes curtilage, “our cases show, all details
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes.”287 Kyllo, in fact, seemed to challenge the entire
construct of intimate details, calling into question the reasoning in
Florida v. Riley.288 
Similarly, the Jones concurrences focused on the revelation of
personal or intimate information made known through the aggrega-
tion of surveillance data collected outside the home.289 As Justice
Sotomayor wrote, “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehen-
283. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
284. See Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 425 (“The tendency to discount informational privacy
interests located outside dwellings seems misguided. If a domain harbors privacy interests
entitled to protection against the physical intrusions known to our ancestors, those interests
should also be shielded against technological surrogates.”).
285. See Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311, 311
(2013).
286. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989). But see id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“What, one wonders, is meant by ‘intimate details’? If the police had observed Riley
embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say that his reasonable
expectation of privacy had been infringed? Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our cases
is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed must be ‘intimate’
in order to be protected by the Constitution?”).
287. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). 
288. See id. at 38 (“Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to ‘intimate details’ would
not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in application, failing to provide ‘a
workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment.’ To begin with, there is no necessary connection between the
sophistication of the surveillance equipment and the ‘intimacy’ of the details that it
observes—which means that one cannot say (and the police cannot be assured) that use of the
relatively crude equipment at issue here will always be lawful.” (citation omitted)).
289. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
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sive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”290 This is so even though all of the information
was in public, and observable by law enforcement. The categories
mentioned—“familial,” “religious,” and “sexual”—all denote intimate
or personal details.
The theory of personal curtilage borrows from these cases,
examining what objective indicia exist that demonstrate that the
actions relate to intimate or personal information. This rule fits
within the traditional curtilage analysis, looking at the uses to
which the area was put. One of the Dunn factors, “use,”291 remains
part of this analysis because, if it could be demonstrated that the
area was used for family or personal activities, this would suggest
it belonged within the more traditional protective categories. The
test is objective and looks at things we traditionally associate with
family or intimate activities.292 
As this Article will discuss in Part IV, the line drawing of what
will be protected is difficult. But, so is the line drawing involving
intimate details in a traditional curtilage analysis. Some areas will
easily fall within the protections—actions involving religious
worship, health, family, or romantic activities will be closer to the
personal or intimate line. Surveillance of professional, political, or
overtly public activities would fall on the other side of the line.
Although the personal or intimate factor is not controlling, it could
influence courts in granting greater protection against a governmen-
tal invasion revealing details that an individual sought to keep
private, even in public. 
290. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation
omitted); see also id. at 956 (“And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS
monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of
intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion,
chooses to track—may ‘alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that
is inimical to democratic society.’ ” (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285
(7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring))).
291. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
292. See id. at 302-03.
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D. Balancing Fourth Amendment Interests Within a Fourth
Amendment Framework
Fourth Amendment doctrine is rife with balancing tests, and the
theory of personal curtilage follows that path.293 Just as traditional
curtilage looks to balance individual interests, societal norms, law
enforcement needs, and constitutional values, so too does personal
curtilage in public.294 The controlling logic of the theory is that this
constitutionally protected space does exist, and it can be defined by
courts through a case-by-case approach. As such, it will be influ-
enced by custom, law, and existing Fourth Amendment theories. 
As this Article will discuss in Part IV, this theory of personal
curtilage will be more protective in some contexts and less protec-
tive in others. It will, like traditional curtilage, offer a framework
for analysis without offering a definitive answer. It also will be a
limited protection, but better than no protection, and clearer than
the status quo of Fourth Amendment doctrine. It is not a revolution,
but a reworking of a traditional test for the modern world. 
E. Sense-Enhancing Trespass
Sense-enhancing technologies alter modern trespass analysis. As
this Article has discussed, many new surveillance technologies
require no physical intrusion, and thus use of those technologies
would result in no Fourth Amendment violation under a traditional
trespass approach. Yet, the danger to Fourth Amendment interests
remains. The work curtilage and traditional trespass did to keep out
the uninvited eye or ear must be adapted to the new modern age.295
293. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989);
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment
in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis,
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1184-1207 (1988).
294. See supra Part II.
295. See Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like
Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 24
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 187 (2012) (“Though doctrinally imperfect as a matter of
constitutional law, the ‘trespass’ rule as a descriptive proxy for measuring the
unreasonableness of government surveillance, at one time, had the practical effect of
adequately protecting privacy in a world where the only way to access one’s thoughts was to
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Justice Scalia recognized this reality in Kyllo when he stated,
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regard-
ing the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area,’ constitutes a search.”296 If curtilage is such a constitu-
tionally protected area, activities conducted therein deserve similar
protection.
The theory of personal curtilage merely applies this logic outside
of the home environment. If someone can demonstrate a claim to a
space of personal curtilage, any sense-enhancing surveillance
technology that invades that protected space would be considered a
Fourth Amendment search.297 At the same time, unenhanced
observation—that is, plain view observation—would not be a search.
Parallel to a traditional curtilage analysis, if a protected space is
invaded by a sense-enhancing trespass the Fourth Amendment has
been implicated.
This new concept of non-physical trespass has support in modern
tort law, as new trespass-based torts arising from electronic
data—unauthorized access,298 spam e-mail,299 paparazzi photos,300
surreptitiously skulk and sneak around one’s home and spy.”).
296. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)) (adding the caveat “at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use”); see also D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality
of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455, 480 n.104 (2001) (“Kyllo
establishes no more than that the use of technology that is functionally equivalent to
trespassing into a home to acquire information is a search.”); Kerr, supra note 18, at 27
(“Kyllo suggests a third approach, by which the trespass test is based on what information
would have been known in the eighteenth century absent a trespass rather than what can be
known without a trespass today.”).
297. See Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our Faith in the Fourth
Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68 (2012), available at http://www.
michiganlawreview.org/articles /how-em-united-states-v-jones-em-can-restore-our-faith-in-
the-fourth-amendment. (“Justice Scalia’s rationale, if updated to consider electronic
penetration a form of trespass, would permit the labeling of more intrusions as searches,
whether they look like traditional trespasses or modern-day, electronic trespasses.”);
Tomkovicz, supra note 10, at 433 (“It is not implausible to contend that when the authorities
use technology to access publicly-situated and physically-exposed details that otherwise would
not or might not be perceptible to human faculties they violate privacy. If the exploitation of
a device enables the government to learn details that could not or would not have been
learned at all by means known to the Framers, not even by methods subject to constitutional
regulation, categorical rejection of a privacy claim based on ‘public location’ does not seem
sensible.”).
298. See, e.g., David M. Fritch, Click Here for Lawsuit—Trespass to Chattels in Cyber-
space, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 31, 40-44 (2004); Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of
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and environmental damages, such as smog and chemicals301—have
evolved to match new non-physical trespass harms.302 All seek to
protect against the intentional intermeddling in the possessory
interest of another.303 
The theory also has roots in traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis.304 After all, Boyd itself involved a non-physical trespass—a
court order,305 and Katz turned on the limitations of trespass to new
forms of communication—wiretap.306 Even cases like Florida v. Riley
and California v. Ciraolo, which at first glance argue against any
protection from non-trespassory surveillance of curtilage—aerial
observation307—did not involve sense-enhancing technologies beyond
Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 428-30 (2002).
299. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
300. See, e.g., Robert M. O’Neil, Ride-alongs, Paparazzi, and Other Media Threats to
Privacy, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (2000) (discussing technological trespass in the
context of reporters invading the privacy of individuals through technological enhancements).
301. See, e.g., Steven Kam, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and a Doctrine of
Cyber-Nuisance, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 427, 440 (2004) (“A modern understanding of
physics blurs the line between actions that qualified traditional trespass, such as bodily
intrusion and bricks thrown through windows and ‘intangible’ invasions now understood to
be ‘physical,’ such as particulate matter (smog, industrial fumes) and electromagnetic
energy.”) (citation omitted).
302. See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[T]he requirement of a tangible [intrusion] has been relaxed almost to the point of being
discarded.”); R. Clifton Merrell, Note, Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 675, 680 (2002).
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 cmts. b, c (1965) (stating that it is
necessary that the trespasser know that his actions are intermeddling with the possessory
interest of another).
304. Going back to first principles, Orin Kerr recognized that one reading of Blackstone
offers a much broader conception of trespass. Blackstone emphasized the accordion-like
quality of trespass in his Commentaries: “ ‘[I]n its largest and most extensive sense,’
Blackstone explained, trespass ‘signifies any transgression or offence against the law of
nature, of society, or of the country in which we live, whether it relates to a man’s person or
his property.’ ” Kerr, supra note 18, at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *208). If Kerr is correct that the trespass theory could be
interpreted in a broader frame, then the doctrine is not confined to a narrow reading of
physical, property-based trespass. Contra id. (“On the other hand, trespass could be
understood in a ‘limited and confined sense’ as only trespass to land.”).
305. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 618 (1886).
306. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
307. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209
(1986).
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mere eyesight.308 Again, the one outlier case is Dow Chemical, which
involved an enhanced surveillance of an industrial property.309 
Although not conclusive, the foregoing argument creates a space
for a new theory of trespass to include sense-enhancing invasions.310
Such a theory complements a new theory of personal curtilage in
public, which this Article will apply in the next Part.
IV. THE THEORY OF PERSONAL CURTILAGE APPLIED
This Part applies the theory of personal curtilage by analyzing
real-world surveillance of people in public. The goal is to determine
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection in terms of new sense-
enhancing technologies involving sound, sight, location, touch, and
scent. 
The theory of personal curtilage provides a workable test for
which public activities should be granted Fourth Amendment
protection from enhanced technological surveillance. If an activity
or area falls within personal curtilage, then any intrusion into that
space by physical or sense-enhancing means is a Fourth Amend-
ment search. Such an area must be a defensible space. It must be
marked by symbolic or actual barriers to sensory invasion. Finally,
such a secure area must be closely tied to intimate associations that
are personal in nature. 
Going back to the initial hypothetical situation that begins this
Article, imagine that authorities employ widespread surveillance
technologies in a particular neighborhood.311 These techniques, as
a matter of practical reality, eviscerate any expectation of privacy,
because the public knows that audio, visual, sensory, and x-ray
devices are in use.312 An ordinary citizen, who happens to be a
308. There is a legitimate counterargument, of course, that plain eyesight from a helicopter
should still be categorized as sense-enhanced technology. 
309. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986). 
310. See Farahany, supra note 117, at 1249 (“The concurrences in Jones underscored that
in the information age, defendants are less concerned about intrusions upon their real
property and more concerned about intrusions upon their information.”).
311. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, DHS Considers Eavesdropping Tech for Spy Drones on
Border, SLATE (Mar. 1, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/03/01/
eavesdropping_drones_may_be_next_for_border_surveillance_efforts_in_texas.html
(acknowledging that drones in use at the international border may be equipped with audio
sensors and eavesdropping capabilities).
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federal judge,313 walks down the street seeking security from some
or all of these law enforcement surveillance measures. What
security can this judge have from these technologies in public, such
that interference with that secure area would be a Fourth Amend-
ment search? What does any citizen have to do to signal that such
a secure area exists?
Answering this question requires isolating different types of
secure interests. A citizen may wish to have security in personal
aspects of communication, physical movements, geolocation,
personal property—including items carried on her person or in
bags—and even scent. Since surveillance technologies can invade
and alter privacy in each of these interests without physical
intrusion, how does the theory of personal curtilage reclaim or
defend security in these interests?
A. Communication Interests
A person speaking in a public space may wish to have a private
conversation with another person, either in person or on a cell
phone. The speaker may be visible to the public, but may seek to
secure the substance of the communication from the ears or
enhanced audio surveillance of the listener. Because aural surveil-
lance technology currently exists to make any public conversation
audible,314 how can the theory of personal curtilage protect commu-
nications in public?
313. Viewing our hypothetical citizen as a federal judge offers a different and perhaps more
revealing lens on the problem of security. The idea derives from two comments from federal
judges who in oral argument both raised the concern that their own conversations or activities
could be monitored by law enforcement. In the oral arguments of United States v. Jones, Chief
Justice Roberts asked the Solicitor General’s representative if the government’s position
meant it could track the Justices without calling it a search. Transcript of Oral Argument at
9, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf. In addition, in the oral
argument of Kee v. City of Rowlett, Texas, 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001), the Justices again
turned to question whether the technologies could be applied against them in their daily lives.
Transcript of Oral Argument, Kee v. City of Rowlett, 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-
10555). See infra note 325 and accompanying text. As federal judges regularly are required
to take positions that challenge executive power, they might well be concerned about the
privacy of their deliberations and activities in public. 
314. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Public Buses Across Country Quietly Adding Microphones to
Record Passenger Conversations, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2012/12/public-bus-audio-surveillance/.
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The first question is whether these private communications are
defensible from unenhanced surveillance. Are private conversations
in public something that can be secured against a government agent
listening in without technological assistance? Under one reading of
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, speakers have little to
no reasonable expectation of privacy in public.315 As Justice Harlan
stated in his Katz concurrence: “conversations in the open would not
be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”316 Courts have not
resolved, however, whether all conversations in public, even
conversations demonstrably meant to be private, lose Fourth
Amendment protections.317 
Custom provides a point of comparison. Judges discuss private
matters in public spaces, be it over lunch in a restaurant or in the
hallways of court.318 Lawyers hold private conversations with clients
outside the confines of their offices.319 Lovers murmur in parks,
315. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Robert
P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun, The Danger to Confidential Communications in the
Mismatch Between the Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and the
Confidentiality of Evidentiary Privileges, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147 (2010) (discussing the
limits of Fourth Amendment protections for privileged conversations).
316. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Of course, such reasoning was tempered by other statements
in Katz that seem to support that certain private conversations might receive some
constitutional protection. See id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.” (citations omitted)).
317. See, e.g., Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The conversations took
place only when no one else was present, and stopped when the telephone was being used or
anyone turned onto the gravel road that was the only entrance to the office. The record thus
indicates that the employees took great care to ensure that their conversations remained
private.”); In re John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240, 244 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The
Supreme Court has long held that an agent can record those conversations which he can hear
with his unaided ear.”); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
loud conversations undermined a reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v.
McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding privacy in conversations in an office,
despite open door and presence of coworkers); Wesley v. WISN Div.-Hearst Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 812, 814 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (discussing conversations in “hushed voices” relevant to
determining reasonable expectation of privacy); Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D.
Nev. 1985) (noting that a loud voice overheard by coworkers undermined reasonable
expectation of privacy and that “[o]ne of the tests used is to ascertain whether the defendant
overheard the communication with the naked ear under uncontrived circumstances”).
318. Kee, 247 F.3d at 215 n.18.
319. Mosteller & Broun, supra note 315, at 154 (“Lawyers do occasionally speak with their
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police consult supervisors on the streets, and millions of people risk
revealing personal information whispering to cell phone receivers in
public. As custom, these private conversations are defensible from
unenhanced surveillance, and each likely warrants some protection. 
As a legal matter, eavesdropping statutes and wiretapping
regulations exist to protect recorded conversations that occur in
public, signifying that spaces protected from surveillance can
exist.320 Katz itself was a case involving protected public—or quasi-
public—communication.321 A few federal courts have even tried to
define the scope of a protected conversation in public. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the issue of
private communications in public and reasoned that a protected
space can exist if individuals take certain precautions:
Primarily, courts have looked to considerations such as (1) the
volume of the communication or conversation; (2) the proximity
or potential of other individuals to overhear the conversation; (3)
the potential for communications to be reported; (4) the affirma-
tive actions taken by the speakers to shield their privacy; (5) the
need for technological enhancements to hear the communica-
tions; and (6) the place or location of the oral communications as
it relates to the subjective expectations of the individuals who
are communicating.322
These non-exclusive factors have guided courts in addressing the
expectation of privacy issues that Katz left open. As described in a
footnote in the Kee decision: 
[W]hile two federal judges may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a hushed conversation on the courthouse steps, they
might lose that expectation of privacy if they spoke loudly, if
clients over lunch in public restaurants, albeit away from others, or at park benches isolated
from others, or in the unoccupied corner of a courthouse hallway just before a hearing for last
minute details.”).
320. See Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001) (challenging the use
of a Massachusetts wiretapping statute to prosecute a criminal defendant for recording the
police); Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape
Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1556 (2008).
321. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (recognizing “the vital role that the public telephone has come
to play in private communication”).
322. Kee, 247 F.3d at 213-14.
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they were surrounded by people who could eavesdrop, if one of
the judges reported the conversation to authorities, if either
party otherwise took actions that would expose the confidential-
ity of their communications, or if they failed to take any affirma-
tive steps to shield their privacy.323
Building from this understanding, the theory of personal
curtilage envisions a limited defensible space for private conversa-
tions, even those undertaken in public. As long as individuals take
certain precautions, signifying the private nature of the conversa-
tion, they should be able to carve out a protected space for their
conversations, even in public. To be clear, this protected space is not
based on a reasonable expectation of privacy, but the concept of
security and the right to exclude as informed by a theory of personal
curtilage.
The second step of a personal curtilage analysis is whether this
defensible space for communications can be marked in such a way
as to make it clear where the protective space begins and ends.
Personal curtilage would protect those conversations in which the
speaker took affirmative steps to keep others from hearing the
conversation. Choices of tone, volume, proximity to others, and steps
to indicate the private nature of the conversation would be indica-
tive of a claim of security.324 People would have a greater claim to
security in the content of whispered conversations than in that of
shouted exclamations, not because only one could be
heard—enhanced surveillance could hear both—but because the
former signifies a marker of exclusion to others.325 Other more
sophisticated procedures such as the use of counter-espionage
devices—sound scramblers, or high-frequency devices—and the like
would also obviously signify a claim of security.326 Courts evaluating
the security of a personal conversation in public would then look to
323. Id. at 215 n.18.
324. See cases cited supra note 318.
325. See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 179 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Courts should bear in
mind that the issue is not whether it is conceivable that someone could eavesdrop on a
conversation but whether it is reasonable to expect privacy.”).
326. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Shields for Privacy in a Smartphone World, N.Y. TIMES, June
25, 2012, at B5 (“Tony Fadell ... said cloaking devices would become available to protect
people’s privacy. What he called audio cloaks could take the form of a hat that rains down
white noise thwarting any possibility of recording someone’s chatter.”).
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these objective actions taken to signify security, similar to Mr. Katz
closing the glass door behind him in the phone booth.327 
The Fourth Amendment would protect most private conversa-
tions because of the personal nature of their content. It makes little
sense to base security protections on the content of communications,
as most private conversations would fall into the category of
personal. After all, even Mr. Katz’s illegal bets to his bookie were
the protected content underlying the Katz case.328
Finally, similar to a traditional curtilage analysis, the interest
protected by this defined and protected space would need to be
balanced with societal interests. Like the Dunn test, and the general
focus on reasonableness, the protection of personal curtilage would
not be absolute.329 The theory of personal curtilage would require a
court to balance the protected area with other societal and law
enforcement interests. The conclusion is not that all conversations
in public are secure from enhanced aural surveillance, but only
those conversations in which the speaker has taken affirmative
action to demonstrate a claim of security from government surveil-
lance. 
B. Visual Surveillance Interests
Visual surveillance is both the most pervasive and unregulated
form of public surveillance in use today.330 As discussed, video
surveillance cameras,331 license plate readers,332 drones,333 and good
327. See Kee, 247 F.3d at 213 n.11 (“For example, Katz had a negligible property or
possessory interest in the telephone booth; did not have an enforceable right to exclude others
from the property; and while legitimately on the premises, did not gain an expectation of
privacy from that position. Instead, the constitutional protections stemmed from the fact that
he subjectively expected his conversations to be private and that he took the normal
precautions available to him to call from inside a booth.”).
328. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
329. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., Don Babwin, Chicago Video Surveillance Gets Smarter, USA TODAY (Sept.
27, 2007, 9:49 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-27-4171345706_
x.htm; Cara Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007,
at A1; John Del Signore, NYPD Tightens Surveillance in Subway’s “Ring of Steel,” GOTHAMIST
(Sept. 21, 2010, 9:37 AM), http://gothamist.com/2010/09/21/nypd_tightens_surveillance_in_
subwa.php.
331. E.g., Slobogin, supra note 129, at 221.
332. See Markoff, infra note 360.
333. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332, 126 Stat. 11
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old-fashioned police observation are in use and, under current
constitutional law, are not considered searches for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.334 From Hester’s “open fields”335 to Katz’s
“exposure,”336 individuals have no expectation of privacy in public
for activities otherwise in plain view.337 The result is that what we
wear, what we do, whom we meet, and even our facial expressions
and gestures are exposed without any constitutional protection.338
Although people in public have always been observed by others, the
prevalence of technology has amplified this exposure and reduced
any expectation of privacy.339
Personal curtilage responds to this unregulated surveillance
reality with a new framework for analysis. It recognizes a defensible
(2012); Somini Sengupta, Lawmakers Set Limits on Police in Using Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2013, at A1; Somini Sengupta, U.S. Border Agency Allows Others To Use Its Drones, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2013, at B1 (describing the limited use of domestic drones for law enforcement
purposes); Andy Pasztor, U.S. Skies Could See More Drones, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4-5, 2012, at
A7 available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020388990457720117039516
1202.html; Ryan Gallagher, FBI Fesses Up: We’ve Used Domestic Drones 10 Times, SLATE
(July 26, 2013, 4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/26/fbi_admits_in
_letter_to_rand_paul_that_it_s_used_domestic_drones_10_times.html (“In none of these cases,
the bureau says, did it apply for a warrant to conduct the drone surveillance. The letter states
that the FBI will seek a warrant when using a drone only if it is attempting ‘to acquire
information in which individuals have reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.’ ”).
334. See Slobogin, supra note 129, at 236 (“[A]ll courts that have considered application of
the Fourth Amendment to cameras aimed at public streets or other areas frequented by a
large number of people have declared that such surveillance is not a search, on the ground
that any expectation of privacy one might have in these areas is unreasonable.”) (citation
omitted); see also Ric Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law Enforcement
Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 711, 725 n.46 (2005).
335. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
337. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927).
338. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute Supporting Respondent at 8, Florida
v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 2641846. (“[T]he DHS has developed
and conducted initial validation of what it calls ‘Future Attribute Screening Technology’ (or
FAST), which monitors specific biologic cues to detect intent to cause harm. Testimony of
Acting Under Secretary Bradley I. Buswell, Science & Tech. Directorate, before the House
Comm. on Approps., Subcomm. on Homeland Security, ‘Science and Technology Research and
Transitioning Products Into Use,’ Mar. 26, 2009, available at http://tinyurl.com/CatoJardines
4.”); Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You’re on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video
Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1090 (1997); Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual
Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 158 (2004).
339. See Simmons, supra note 123, at 1332-35.
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space from public visual surveillance, but also recognizes that
marking that space may prove to be quite difficult in practice.
Building upon privacy law conceptions of seclusion and intrusion,
personal curtilage reclaims a space from intrusive public surveil-
lance beyond the current protections of the reasonable expectation
of privacy test.340 
This space, constitutionally defensible from visual surveillance
in public, derives from Fourth Amendment and privacy law
scholarship. Both doctrines recognize that whereas unenhanced
surveillance presents no grounds for security or privacy claims,
overly intrusive surveillance that reveals details unavailable by
ordinary means should be protected against. 
First, several Fourth Amendment scholars have recognized a
limited right to be free from extensive governmental visual surveil-
lance. Professor Slobogin, in a seminal article on the subject, wrote
of a protected “right to anonymity” that can be compromised by
invasive, omnipresent public surveillance.341 Other scholars have
chosen to focus on “the architecture of privacy” in order to find
protected public spaces.342 Still others have looked to reframe the
understanding of privacy as a collective right,343 comparing it to an
ongoing struggle against government observation.344 The definitions
and analysis differ, but courts have recognized some space free from
continuous governmental observation, even in public.345 
340. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1472-75
(2000) (describing “routinized low-tech data collection”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 496 (2006); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2002).
341. Slobogin, supra note 129, at 217 (“[W]e all possess a ‘right to anonymity,’ even when
in public.”); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 169 (noting the intrusiveness of physical and
transactional surveillance on the right to anonymity and arguing for more regulation of such
surveillance); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1970) (“The third state of privacy,
anonymity, occurs when the individual is in public places ... but still seeks, and finds, freedom
from identification and surveillance.”). 
342. E.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1413-25 (2004).
343. E.g., Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth
Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297, 317-35 (1985).
344. E.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501 (2007); Taslitz,
supra note 11, at 158-69.
345. E.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta that
even in places without a general privacy right, a person may have an expectation of privacy
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Privacy scholars have echoed this constitutional understanding,
carving out a protected public space against unreasonable govern-
mental intrusion.346 Building off the common law tort of intrusion,347
scholars such as Jane Bambauer have developed a new vision of
intrusion appropriate for a surveillance world.348 As Professor
Bambauer explains:
The tort of intrusion imposes liability on anybody who intention-
ally intrudes on the seclusion of another if the intrusion would
be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” The intrusion tort
protects an interest in respite from observation and judgment
(when the expectation of seclusion is reasonable.) A right to
seclusion is justified by a number of theories: Seclusion allows
us to engage in “productive secrets”—surprises may be planned,
plots may be concocted, and new aspects of our individuality can
be tried out without censure.349
Although not easily defined, the tort focuses on the prying
nature of the visual observation:350
against being videotaped in a public area); State v. Thomas, 642 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994) (recognizing that certain surveillance may violate the Fourth Amendment if it is
from a non-public vantage point).
346. But see Heidi Reamer Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense
of No Privacy in Public, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2012); Andrew Jay McClurg,
Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public
Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1076 (1995) (“[T]here is no longer any viable tort remedy for
injuries resulting from the dissemination of true information concerning an individual, no
matter how private the information or how offensive the dissemination would be to a
reasonable person.”).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (“One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (defining one kind of tortious invasion of privacy as “[i]ntrusion
upon the plaintiff ’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs”).
348. See Jane Yakowtiz Bambauer, The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205 (2012).
349. Id. at 230-31.
350. See id. at 230 (“Suppose an obstetrician invites a friend to watch him perform a
childbirth. The expectant mother mistakenly assumes that the friend, dressed in scrubs and
introduced as a ‘helper,’ is a medical student or surgical assistant. The friend’s observation
may have been quite valuable to him personally. Perhaps it indirectly improved the world by
inspiring the friend to attend nursing school. Nevertheless, the observation was tortious.”).
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Intrusion guards our affairs from the “prying eyes or ears of
others.” It only offers a remedy when the eyes and ears are
prying—that is, when an intruder has notice of a person’s
reasonable expectation of seclusion and intentionally makes an
observation anyway. An intrusion requires a deliberate investi-
gation. But by the same token, when a deliberate, obnoxious
observation has taken place, liability is appropriate even in
instances where the information learned ends up being highly
valuable or newsworthy.351
Obtaining information about public activities available only
through the use of sense-enhancing surveillance technologies
constitutes prying.352 For the theory of personal curtilage, the key is
that sense-enhancing technology works to reveal something
unavailable with ordinary visual surveillance, which the individual
has given notice they do not want revealed. 
This defensible space is necessarily a limited one, and primarily
will be protected from enhanced visual surveillance that reveals not
just the presence of a person at a particular location but intimate
details that are closer to the idea of intrusion or prying. For
example, because video surveillance provides the ability to magnify,
link, and observe other details not accessible through ordinary
observation,353 the surveillance will reveal certain details beyond
mere presence. Issues of magnification,354 biometrics,355 or linked
351. Id. at 231. But see Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000) (arguing that a theory of informational privacy
should be grounded in a search for “autonomy in fact,” instead of political rhetoric); Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405 (1981) (arguing that privacy is
economically inefficient).
352. In the context of a tort, as in the context of a constitutional search, any remedy may
turn on the extent rather than the fact of the intrusion. 
353. Blitz, supra note 342, at 1383 (“Networks of video cam[e]ras function not only as video
cameras, but also, when linked together and given the capacity to identify and lock onto a
person, as tracking devices. Supplemented with zoom capacities and infrared detectors, they
might reveal features of a person that are normally invisible even to bystanders only a few
yards away. And with the aid of biometric identification devices, they might also provide
investigators with information of a sort that is not normally sensed at all. They might reveal
the name of an unknown individual in a photograph or videotape, and investigators might
then link this identifying information to other personal information.”).
354. E.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 n.5 (1986) (finding that the
camera did not capture “identifiable human faces”).
355. E.g., Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 704-05 (2004) (“Biometrics are identification techniques based on
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facial recognition databases356 represent new intrusions beyond the
collection of simple observational facts. Although perhaps a video of
a judge standing inside a private cemetery might not be protected,
the enhanced video close-up of a judge’s tears at the cemetery might
be. If, as this Article will discuss, an individual has also taken steps
to avoid ordinary visual observation, then the use of the enhanced
technology intrudes on this sense of seclusion. 
As noted, that a constitutionally defensible space exists does not
alone establish a claim of personal curtilage. In addition, there must
be markers to define the space.357 Certain obvious markers exist in
theory. One could wear a mask or disguise in public.358 Technology
now exists to thwart facial recognition devices,359 blind license plate
some unique, physiological, and difficult-to-alienate characteristic. Current forms of
identification often rely on relatively primitive biometrics such as skin, hair and eye color,
physical markings, gender, and facial hair. These characteristics are often portrayed in a
photograph or list of physical characteristics, such as those used on a driver’s license.”); Ellen
Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at A1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/21AR200712210
2544.html.
356. Blitz, supra note 342, at 1354; John J. Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious
Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 67
(2002); Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 281, 288 (“Facial recognition software has already been combined with video
surveillance and used by law enforcement to identify potential suspects amongst large
crowds.”) (citations omitted).
357. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth
Amendment Suspicion , 55 ARIZ. L. REV . 997, 997 (2013) (describing “privacy protests:
actions individuals  take  to  block  or to thwart surveillance for reasons unrelated to
criminal wrongdoing”) (citations omitted); Nick Bilton, Shields for Privacy in a
Smartphone World ,  N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, at B5 (“Other counter-recording
technologies could be hidden in a necklace that shoots out infrared light and blurs pictures
taken in your direction; or a radarlike watch that vibrates when an audio recorder is active
nearby.”).
358. See, e.g., MISSION: IMPOSSIBLE III (Paramount Pictures 2006) (demonstrating the use
of masks and disguises). But see Note, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the
First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821 (1991).
359. E.g., Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric
Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 663-64 (2003) (“[T]he accuracy rate of a
facial imaging system may vary tremendously when tested against those actively trying to
conceal their appearance as opposed to those who are trying to be recognized for access. In a
recent demonstration of the problem, National Geographic magazine asked a former CIA
operative to try to fool a facial imaging system using techniques such as glasses, facial hair
and head positioning. When the system tried to match the operative’s current photo against
various types of disguised images, the level of correlation ranged from roughly 60 percent to
80 percent.”) (citing David Shenk, Watching You: The World of High-Tech Surveillance, 204
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 3, 18 (Nov. 2003)); Jimmy Stamp, The Privacy Wars: Goggles That Block
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readers,360 and otherwise directly respond to visual surveillance.361
In fact, technology now exists to counter drone surveillance,
including, quite inventively, “anti-drone” fashion accessories.362 One
could live like certain celebrities, ducking into underground garages,
using bodyguards and body doubles, and essentially maintaining
public privacy by avoiding public events.363 The methods underlying
these markers are, of course, neither practical nor simple, but do
create some protection beyond the reasonable expectation of privacy
test.364
Facial Recognition Technology, SMITHSONIAN MAG. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2013), http://blogs.smith
sonianmag.com/design/2013/02/the-privacy-wars-goggles-that-block-facial-recognition-
technology/.
360. E.g., John Markoff, Protesting the Big Brother Lens, Little Brother Turns an Eye Blind,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/07/business/
protesting-the-big-brother-lens-little-brother-turns-an-eye-blind.html; Dan Oldenburg, Drivers
Try an Anti-Photo Finish, WASH. POST, July 21, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A222-2004Jul20.html.
361. E.g., Jesse Emspak, How to Beat Facial-Recognition Software, NBCNEWS.COM (Jan.
26, 2012, 4:49 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46153896/ns/technology_and_science-
security/t/how-beat-facial-recognition-software/; John D. Sutter, How to Hide from Face-
detection Technology, CNN.COM BLOGS (Apr. 29, 2012), http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2012/
04/29/how-to-hide-from-face-detection-technology/.
362. Tim Maly, Anti-Drone Camouflage: What to Wear in Total Surveillance, WIRED (Jan.
17, 2013, 3:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/01/anti-drone-camouflage-apparel/
(describing artist Adam Harvey’s collection of “Stealth Wear” clothing, which “includes an
anti-drone hoodie and scarf that are designed to thwart the thermal-imaging technology
widely used by UAVs, and the OFF Pocket, a phone accessory that blocks all incoming and
outgoing communication from your phone”); Catherine New, Domestic Drone
Countermeasures, Oregon Company, To Sell Defense Systems Direct To Consumers,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2013, 5:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/domes
tic-drone-countermeasures_n_2916974.html (“Oregon-based company Domestic Drone
Countermeasures announced last month that it would sell customized anti-drone defense
systems to anyone interested in a little extra privacy.... Domestic Drone Countermeasures’
anti-drone system would not disable drone technology nor jam the machines, ... but would
neutralize the ability of a small air-bound drone to capture sound and images through its on-
board cameras, video recorders and microphones.”).
363. The difficulties of celebrities offer an ironic twist in that the reason for the surveil-
lance is precisely that these individuals have put themselves out in the public eye.
364. These steps, of course, raise the real question of how far should an individual be
required to go to assert security. National security professionals use secure offices, secure
computers, and secure phone lines on a daily basis. Luppe B. Luppen, Note, Just When I
Thought I Was Out, They Pull Me Back In: Executive Power and the Novel Reclassification
Authority, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115, 1124-25 (2007) (“[Those with top secret clearances]
handle information that is carefully isolated behind alarmed vault doors and in burglary
resistant safes or can be accessed only through secure computer networks or in hardened and
well-defended facilities.”) (citations omitted); see also Vicki Divoll, The “Full Access Doctrine”:
Congress’s Constitutional Entitlement to National Security Information from the Executives,
1352 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1283
The final element is the intimacy aspect involved in visual
surveillance. Most of our public activities do not involve intimate
personal activities. Yet, the theory of personal curtilage defends
against those occasions when there should be protection.365 In
certain cases, use of magnification, linkage of visual surveillance
feeds, or aggregation of data points that reveal intimacies unknow-
able with old-fashioned surveillance might reveal enough about
personal activities to warrant Fourth Amendment protection.366 As
with the traditional curtilage test, the ultimate Fourth Amendment
decision will involve a balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, our federal judge will have only a limited protection from
visual surveillance under a personal curtilage theory. Although it is
a greater protection than under current Fourth Amendment law,
which provides no protection against visual surveillance in public,
it may not offer much comfort. However, as surveillance technolo-
gies grow in scope and capabilities, and a reasonable expectation of
privacy shrinks, the framework offers a stronger theory to carve out
and claim a defensible space.
C. Geolocational Interests
Where we go reveals what we do, and perhaps a measure of who
we are or want to be. Location, when combined with information
about individuals, organizations, and services in an area, can
produce a wealth of information about a person. Geolocational
surveillance involves a host of tracking technologies including
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 505 n.42 (2011) (“The SSCI and the HPSCI conduct all of
their business in a ‘Secure Compartmented Information Facility’ (SCIF). The classified
materials the executive entrusts to Congress are kept in vaults within the SCIF, and a
professional security staff monitors them. Any member of Congress who wishes to read
classified material must do so in a committee SCIF, under the supervision of security
personnel.”). Yet, the start-up costs to establish that type of secure network are prohibitive.
GPS devices can be counteracted with scrambling devices. Individuals could be required to
don costumes and practice countersurveillance tactics worthy of a spy novel. LINDSAY MORAN,
BLOWING MY COVER: MY LIFE AS A CIA SPY 139-42 (2005) (discussing surveillance training).
These affirmative assertions of security would be sufficient; but they may also not be
necessary when more common sense practices would do.
365. One can imagine a burial for a pet in the backyard, a prayerful walk in the woods, or
a midnight skinny dip as all public, intimate events that deserve a claim of protection. 
366. E.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff ’d in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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highly sophisticated GPS tracking devices, low-tech beepers, and
other devices that reveal the location of the person in real time.367 
Again, the first question is whether geolocational tracking
information is the type of activity against which a judge, or citizen,
can claim a defensible space. The Supreme Court in Jones resolved
one aspect of this question quite easily. Attaching a tracking device
by means of physical trespass, whether to a car or a person, clearly
constitutes invasion of a recognized defensible space.368 This would
be true both for attaching a geolocational tracking device to a car or
person. There exists a recognized defensible space from having one’s
property—or person—physically intruded upon in order to attach a
tracking device.
The Jones Court, as discussed, avoided deciding the more
challenging question of whether obtaining the same geolocational
information without a physical intrusion constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. The five concurring Justices appear to recog-
nize that long-term tracking for most crimes would violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy.369 Further, in Karo370 and
Knotts,371 two early beeper cases, the Supreme Court held that a
search occurs when police use technology to obtain information not
otherwise available to public observation, such as the location of a
barrel in a private home,372 but not when the beeper merely
augments the visual observation of a suspect travelling in public.373
Reading Karo and Knotts together, a reasonable expectation of
privacy test might protect only information in homes that could not
be obtained through ordinary visual observation.374 
367. See Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 14, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259),
2011 WL 4564007 at *14.
368. As Justice Scalia stated in Jones, physically occupying private property for the
purpose of obtaining information constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 949.
369. This conclusion results from adding the votes in both Justice Sotomayor’s concurring
opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion written for four Justices. See id. at 955, 964.
370. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
371. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277-78 (1983).
372. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
373. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”); see
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
374. This is also supported by the reasoning in Kyllo.
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A theory of personal curtilage expands this protection and
recognizes an ability to defend against extended and aggregated
locational tracking that reveals information not available through
ordinary visual observation in public.375 Although geolocational
tracking provides an odd fit for an analogy based on “space,” the
same arguments in support of a defense against intrusion, or for
anonymity, hold. One can see this most easily in two contexts. First,
when information about the places visited reveals information that
could not be obtained by mere visual surveillance, we have a
situation that fits the expanded Knotts/Karo rule. Second, the
observation of patterns through the aggregation of data, which could
not be known through mere visual surveillance, fits with the Jones
concurrences’ rule.376 As with visual surveillance, geolocational
security includes freedom from ubiquitous data collection and the
resulting technological aggregation of such data unavailable
through ordinary means.
Again, stating that a defensible space for geolocational security
exists is only the first step. To establish protection under a personal
curtilage theory, an individual would also have to mark out this
expectation of security from surveillance. What could our federal
judge do to prevent locational tracking that symbolically or actually
marks out a secure space? What if the judge did not want the
government to know about a medical condition or substance abuse
problem? 
Defining areas of personal locational security is difficult in
practice. Clearly, an individual could post signs—bumper stick-
ers—stating “do not track” on a car. Individuals could employ GPS
scrambling devices or practice countersurveillance techniques,
including switching cars or having decoy cars.377 One could drive
someone else’s car to avoid geolocational tracking. In fact, Antoine
Jones did just that as the car at issue in the case was registered to
375. Again, this Article focuses only on governmental surveillance, not third-party
surveillance.
376. For example, locational data can tell not only that a person was at a health clinic, but
how long an individual was at the clinic, how often they returned, and if the tracking is tied
to the person—not just a car—it would clearly provide information that could not be observed
in public. 
377. Check Your Car for a GPS Tracker, WIRED (May 14, 2011, 12:42 AM),
http://howto.wired.com/wiki/Check_Your_Car_for_a_GPS_Tracker. 
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his wife.378 One could drive at night, or intentionally take mass
transit, making physical tracking by law enforcement difficult.
Though such evasive tactics would show a desire for security from
tracking, these markers would also have the unintended conse-
quence of identifying those who sought security from surveillance,
unless adopted by everyone.379 These tactics are also inconvenient
and impractical for ordinary citizens who would prefer security from
geolocational surveillance but would rather not live like counter-
espionage agents. 
The line protecting only intimate details is also hard to draw for
locational data because, although a significant amount of personal
information could be revealed through location, the lines separating
the private from the public are not clear. Going to the doctor for an
annual check-up might not reveal anything more than the fact that
one takes responsibility for one’s health. Going to the obstetrician
and then an abortion clinic might reveal a significant life event.
Though both may reveal personal information made obvious by
geographic location, those stemming from the latter type of situation
are far more intimate. Yet, if our federal judge took the necessary
precautions to mask her location and her travel out of a concern for
security from governmental observation, these steps should provide
a measure of protection. In short, locational interests may be
protected under a theory of personal curtilage, although perhaps not
in any useful form. Individuals will be able to take certain steps,
and those steps will raise the level of security of their movements.
But most people—criminals and federal judges—will not take the
necessary steps to signal a greater claim to security in their
locational data. In this way, personal curtilage offers an equivalent,
but perhaps not superior, framework to Katz for protecting against
geolocational surveillance. 
D. Personal Property Interests
Individuals carry personal effects every day. We carry items in
pockets, purses, wallets, briefcases, and under our clothes. Gener-
378. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
379. Certainly, initially, it might be a wise use of police resources to focus on those
individuals who purchased “do not track” stickers and scrambling devices, as they might have
something to hide.
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ally, we expect that items hidden in containers380 or under clothes381
will remain secure from observation from others, even when we are
out in public.382 Yet, as discussed, backscatter and other imaging
technologies exist that can reveal items of contraband or curiosity
through x-ray-like images.383 Police can now see whether you are
carrying a gun or gum in your purse.384 The general protections of
basic physics no longer define the limits of surveillance.385 
As custom and case law have well established, this space is
defensible and warrants Fourth Amendment protection, whether
in closed containers386 or under clothing. Two lines of cases exem-
plify this traditional understanding of security. First, the Supreme
Court has required a heightened level of suspicion to open closed
380. United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 1430, 1435 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[A]ll containers ... will
receive the full protection of the fourth amendment during a police search [if the owner has]
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
381. United States v. Askew, 529 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the area underneath his jacket);
Michael C. v. Gresbach, 526 F.3d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the plaintiffs had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in body parts covered by clothing).
382. One caveat to this statement is items that are strictly contraband under a binary
search analysis. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005).
383. David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun
Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996); William M. Bradshaw, Note, Borderline:
Why the Federal Government May Use Backscatter Technology to Search Vehicles and
Containers at International Borders, but the Fourth Amendment May Block Its Use on Persons,
44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1359-61 (2011). See generally Wayne R. LaFave, 1 SEARCH &
SEIZURE 636-51 (5th ed. 2012).
384. Sean K. Driscoll, “The Lady of the House” vs. A Man with a Gun: Applying Kyllo to
Gun-Scanning Technology, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 601, 603 (2013) (analyzing the constitutional
impact of gun scanning technologies); Al Baker, Police Working on Technology to Detect
Concealed Guns, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/01/17/police-working-on -technology-to-detect-concealed-guns; Carmen Cox, NYPD
and Defense Department Testing Gun Scan Technology, ABC NEWS RADIO (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://abcnewsradioonline.com/national-news/nypd-and-defense-department-testing-gun-scan-
technology.html.
385. Jim Harper, Reforming Fourth Amendment Privacy Doctrine, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1381,
1398 (2008).
386. E.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiffs
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of opaque bags); United States v. Gust,
405 F.3d 797, 803-05 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a plastic case because it was not identifiable as gun case to the general public);
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 380 F.3d 349, 353 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
students had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bags because the bags concealed
contents from view).
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containers, even those containers associated with individuals
suspected of crime.387 Although exceptions exist for searches
incident to arrest388 and when containers are in automobiles,389 the
closed container doctrine demonstrates the recognition of a defensi-
ble space of personal property. Similarly, searches of persons,
including physical manipulation of objects390 or effects391 on or near
those persons, require a heightened level of suspicion to invade that
protected space.392 The understanding that individuals have security
and privacy interests in those protected spaces, including the right
to be free from governmental intrusion, underlies these decisions.393
Custom and case law also provide us with the means to mark out
our expectation of security. We use pockets and bags to carry our
belongings. We wear unrevealing clothes to hide what we want to
hide from public view. We undertake these actions so habitually
that we rarely think of them as marking out a space of security. But,
for purposes of personal curtilage, these steps would be sufficient to
establish a defensible, delineated space of security. To maintain that
security, individuals will need to continue to mark it as a space for
protection. 
In terms of intimate detail, the things we keep in our pockets are
generally personal and reveal some level of private information
387. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (“For just as the most frail cottage
in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic
mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a
paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official
inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.” (citation omitted));
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (“Unlike an automobile, whose primary
function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a
person’s expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an
automobile.”), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)).
388. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
389. E.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 617, 623-24 (2004).
390. E.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993).
391. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-
508 (1983).
392. E.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (requiring probable cause for a search of a closed
container in a vehicle).
393. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891))).
1358 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1283
about ourselves.394 In fact, almost by definition, because of the item’s
closeness to the body or person, it retains a heightened protection.395
Although there is nothing inherently revealing about the business
card in my wallet, its placement in that area makes the information
protected.396 Personal curtilage would respect that choice as a
protected area.
For concealed personal property, the theory of personal curtilage
may well provide more protection than the reasonable expectation
of privacy test. X-ray and other see-through technology will
eventually make all concealed items potentially observable.397
Bodies, and items we carry on our bodies, will enjoy no more
protection in public than when subjected to TSA imaging technology
in a routine airport screening. Yet, with the theory of personal
curtilage, we might be able to claim an interest in security, even
when technology has erased our privacy. 
E. Odor/Vapor/Molecular Interests
Human beings smell.398 Billions of dollars in personal hygiene
products, air fresheners, and air purifiers exist to mask the human
scent and its byproducts.399 Human beings possess and carry things
that smell. Technological devices now exist to vacuum and test the
394. Cf. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572 (acknowledging a “heightened privacy expectation in
personal luggage”).
395. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 308 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Purses
are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that people generally
like to keep with them at all times. So I am tempted to say that a search of a purse involves
an intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule should govern both.
However, given this Court’s prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the container was
a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the Court has warned against trying to
make that kind of distinction. But I can say that it would matter if a woman’s purse, like a
man’s billfold, were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of ‘outer clothing,’
which under the Court’s cases would properly receive increased protection.”).
396. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30.
397. Alyson L. Rosenberg, Comment, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon in
the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 135, 136-
37 (1998); Andy Greenberg, Full-Body Scan Technology Deployed in Street-Roving Vans,
FORBES (Aug. 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2010/08/24/full-
body-scan-technology-deployed-in-street-roving-vans/.
398. See, e.g., Terrell v. State, 239 A.2d 128, 130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968).
399. Elizabeth Holmes, Perfume Bottles Gone Wild, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2012, at D1
(reporting that sales of fragrances in the United States in 2011 neared $5.8 billion).
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molecular vapors emitted from persons and machines.400 These new
technologies purport to detect everything from heightened sweat on
nervous people401 to chemical weapons.402
People retain no level of Fourth Amendment privacy in scent
because it is considered a naturally occurring byproduct of human
existence or lifestyle. Over the years, courts have developed the
“plain smell” test that essentially allows police officers to develop
probable cause and reasonable suspicion using their own unaided
faculties.403 Such a plain smell sniff is not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. In addition, courts have considered trained
police dogs sniffing out contraband in luggage and cars not to be a
search for Fourth Amendment purposes.404 Dog sniffs of people, if
invasive enough, may constitute a search, although courts disagree
on the matter.405 Courts have not decided the issue of whether a
400. New Homeland Security Laser Scanner Reads People at Molecular Level, CBS (July
11, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/07/11/new-homeland-security-laser-
scanner-reads-people-at-molecular-level/ (“This laser-based scanner—which can be used 164-
feet away—could read everything from a person’s adrenaline levels, to traces of gun powder
on a person’s clothes, to illegal substances—and it can all be done without a physical search.
It also could be used on multiple people at a time, eliminating random searches at airports.”).
401. See Jenny Parker Smith, Comment, Threatsense Technology: Sniffing Technology and
the Threat to Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 615, 618 (2011)
(discussing threatsense technologies that can sniff chemicals and other compounds in the air);
Randy Dotinga, Can’t Hide Your Lying ... Face?, WIRED (Oct. 14, 2004), http://www.wired.com/
science/discoveries/news/2004/10/65322.
402. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Cato Institute Supporting Respondent at 9, Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 2641846 *9 (“A DHS program that
might be directed not only at persons, but also at their houses and effects, is called the
Remote Vapor Inspection System (or RVIS). RVIS generates laser beams at various
frequencies to be aimed at a target vapor. Beams reflected and scattered back to the sensor
head reveal spectral ‘signatures’ that can be compared with the signatures of sought-after
gasses and particulates.... Using RVIS, government agents might remotely examine the
molecular content of the air in houses and cars, quietly and routinely explore the gasses
exiting houses through chimneys and air ducts, and perhaps even silently inspect any person’s
exhaled breath.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
403. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932); see also Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 1016 (1948); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) overruled by United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
404. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (declaring that a dog sniff of luggage
in public did not constitute a search); Richard E. Myers II, In the Wake of Caballes, Should
We Let Sniffing Dogs Lie?, 20 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5 (2006); see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct.
1050, 1053 (2013) (distinquishing between the “alert” of a drug-sniffing dog and a search).
405. United States v. Kelly, 302 F.3d 291, 293 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that an up-close
sniff of a person constitutes a search if the dog contacts the person’s body); State v. Boyce, 723
P.2d 28, 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the Washington Constitution requires
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high-tech “smell-o-matic” scent machine, which Justice Kagan
hypothetically proposed during the Florida v. Jardines oral
argument,406 might change the analysis.407
Although no reasonable expectation of privacy may lie in one’s
scent, this does not negate an expectation of security under a
personal curtilage theory. Personal curtilage first asks whether the
Fourth Amendment may defend an area or activity against
unenhanced government surveillance. Both high-end and low-end
masking agents—fancy perfume or mothballs—can prevent law
enforcement from smelling hidden items.408 In Florida v. Jardines,
the Supreme Court evaluated an officer’s investigation of a home
whose occupants dispersed mothballs, the officer believed, to mask
the smell of marijuana.409 The personal curtilage theory would
consider this action sufficient to claim a defensible space against
sniffer technology.410 
By objectively indicating a desire for security, masking agents
also help define the second step of the analysis. Plainly, Jardines
covered his house with a mothball smell precisely in order to defend
against law enforcement—and neighborhood—interference with his
activities.411 Similarly, if one were travelling with bags full of
illegally obtained exotic mushrooms or wildflowers, use of a
masking agent to cover the smell would signal a desire for security
from inspection. Although individuals might believe that the use of
masking agents arouses the suspicion of police, such agents also
serve as barriers to surveillance.412 
courts to evaluate a canine sniff on a case-by-case basis).
406. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-17, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564)
(“JUSTICE KAGAN: So does that mean that if we invented some kind of little machine called
a, you know, smell-o-matic and the police officer had this smell-o-matic machine, and it
alerted to the exact same things that a dog alerts to, it alerted to a set of drugs, meth and
marijuana and whatever else, the police officer could not come to the front door and use that
machine?”).
407. See, e.g., Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 287-89 (2005) (“[I]t is clear
that whether the evidence is gathered by a live drug-sniffing dog or an electronic handheld
device, the legal principles involved are the same.”).
408. The key is the affirmative decision to mask the smell.
409. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564).
410. Contra id. at 35-36.
411. See id. at 35.
412. As discussed in the oral arguments of Florida v. Jardines, the officer said he suspected
marijuana because he considered the scent of mothballs a masking agent. Id. at 19.
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The issue of intimacy is complicated when it comes to scent.
Clearly, personal scents may be quite intimate, embarrassing, or
revealing. If a device could detect alcohol vapors emanating from a
body that had been drinking heavily, this information would be
personal and private. Other human scents, pheromones, or byprod-
ucts also deserve some protection. In contrast, the information
revealed by a device that could detect vapors from a particular
chemical compound in a rare petunia stolen from a national park
would be much less personal.413 As in the other line drawing
situations, intimacy will be one factor in the analysis and may, like
other discussions of curtilage, be a reason not to find protection. Yet,
as this Article has discussed, the theory of personal curtilage
provides protections that do not exist at all under a reasonable
expectation of privacy theory.
F. Concluding Thoughts
In a world of panoptic surveillance, one could concede that
individuals have lost any expectation of privacy or security in
public. Or, one could design a framework to carve out certain
constitutionally defensible areas within that public space that
balances the needs of security with individual liberty. Like the
creation of the curtilage principle in the first place, this Article
argues that there needs to be an evolution of protection from the
four fixed walls to some greater space. Personal curtilage offers that
evolution to protect individuals in public from sense-enhancing
technologies. 
To answer the question that starts this Article, a limited Fourth
Amendment space can exist free from enhanced technological
surveillance in public. The theory of personal curtilage presents an
objective test modeled on the Dunn curtilage analysis.414 This
framework allows for security from sense-enhancing technological
surveillance in public.415 It recognizes that the technology that now
413. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of
Respondent, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 2641847 (“[Petunias and cocaine
produce] methyl benzoate[,] ... a decomposition product or break-down product that is
produced when cocaine hydrochloride is exposed to humid air.”).
414. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301-03 (1987).
415. See supra Part III.C.
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exists—and will exist in the future—will erase any privacy interests
if expectations of privacy function as the only test.416 Thus, it shifts
the locus of control from society’s expectation to an individual’s
actions.417 It is an imperfect test. For some technologies, this theory
of personal curtilage provides no more protection than does the
current doctrine. Yet, its virtue is that it provides the flexibility to
react and counter encroaching surveillance technologies in ways
that the current standard cannot. 
V. CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS
The theory of personal curtilage presents several obvious
concerns in application. First, is it better than the current standard
of a reasonable expectation of privacy test? Second, is it adaptable
to new, not-yet-developed technologies? Third, can it be applied
across state and federal courts in a consistent manner? Each of
these concerns is valid and will be addressed below. 
Is the personal curtilage theory better than the reasonable
expectation of privacy theory? Such normative claims are probably
better left for others to evaluate, but personal curtilage offers two
key advantages over the current Fourth Amendment paradigm.
First, in the face of omnipresent surveillance technology, it refuses
to concede that individuals retain no protections in public. In
carving out a space of personal security, even if limited and difficult
to sustain, the theory still maintains some protected space. If, as
may happen in the future, aerial surveillance devices can observe,
listen, track, and link observational data to other surveillance
technologies, individuals may need to maintain such a space.
Second, personal curtilage focuses on individuals as the key actors
to control this secure space. Unlike the ex post determination of
societal expectations of privacy by judges, personal curtilage places
some measure of prospective personal responsibility in the hands of
individuals. This shift may be impractical, but it will have impor-
tant educational benefits for citizens.418 Under one reading, the
416. See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
417. See supra Part III.B.
418. Under the current doctrine, little incentive exists to determine the existence of and
prevent invasive surveillance. However, if courts respect the steps individuals take to protect
their rights, then the analysis and incentives shift. In this way, putting the responsibility for
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expectation of privacy test creates a passive citizenry, ignorant of
technological change, and dependent on courts. Placing the onus on
citizens to act, react, and claim ownership of constitutionally
protected spaces may have important secondary benefits in the form
of participation and engagement with these constitutional issues.
Is the personal curtilage theory adaptable to new technological
surveillance innovations? Fourth Amendment doctrine has tradi-
tionally lagged behind new technologies. The incremental case-by-
case structure is, by design, a retrospective rather than a prospec-
tive enterprise. The result is that any new doctrinal test must be
flexible enough to adapt to new technologies. As stated, personal
curtilage invites flexibility because it invites reaction. Although
seemingly impractical today, self-protection technologies may
become the norm. In an earlier era, no one locked a bicycle or put an
alarm on a car, but now almost everyone does. Perhaps the same
will happen to image blocking or GPS scrambling devices. The value
of personal curtilage is that it encourages a technological defense to
technological intrusion. In large measure, it invites active citizens
to resist active governmental surveillance. 
Finally, will personal curtilage be applied in a consistent
manner? The answer is likely no. Any study of the doctrine of
traditional curtilage will reveal a haphazard, case-by-case approach
that is incredibly fact dependent.419 The same will likely happen
with the theory of personal curtilage. Yet, this inconsistency is a
virtue not a vice. As may be evident from the argument laid out
throughout this Article, defining a space, marking it, and connecting
it to principles of intimacy and autonomy is not a simple task. One
must weigh, balance, and analyze each factor. Courts addressing
personal curtilage should also have the flexibility to weigh the
different factors. In this way, courts may define a space consistent
with the existing Fourth Amendment norms and principles. 
The theory of personal curtilage is an innovation, but not an
easy solution to easing the ongoing tensions between security and
liberty in the Fourth Amendment doctrine. It offers a new and more
protective framework for analysis.420 It addresses the growing
building the virtual curtilage wall in the hands of the people will make citizens more readily
understanding of the threat to their security.
419. See supra Part II.A.
420. Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
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problem of technological change—a problem the Supreme Court
Justices themselves know to be an issue.421 It offers a theoretical
framework that focuses on security, personal responsibility, and the
preservation of intimate information as a more promising basis from
which to analyze the Fourth Amendment in public. Like the legal
fiction of traditional curtilage, it recognizes that the law must evolve
to create buffer spaces where people can be secure from government
technologies.
American Bar Association’s Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 383, 386-87
(1997) (explaining courts’ slow adaptation to modern-day technology and the ABA helping to
provide newer standards that balance law enforcement and privacy).
421. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Kagan Sees Privacy as One of Most Important Future Issues
for Court, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
kagan_sees_privacy_as_one_of_most_important_future_issues_for_court/ (noting Kagan as
citing the concerns of Louis Brandeis who “understood how new technologies interfere with
privacy, which I think will be one of the most important issues before the court in the decades
to come”).
